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Articles
Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream
of Commerce Theory: A Reappraisal
and a Revised Approach
BY MOLLIE A. MURPHY*
INTRODUCTION
Since Gray v American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,'
American courts have readily asserted jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent manufacturers and distributors whose injury-causing prod-
ucts have reached the forum as a result of their purposeful
introduction into the "stream of commerce.' '2 This stream of
commerce concept supports the forum's exercise of junsdic-
tion-although the product's presence there is the immediate
result of the independent actions and objectives of intermediaries
* Adjunct Professor, Case Western Reserve Umversity School.of Law. B.A. 1977,
St. Mary's College; J.D. 1980, Umversity of Notre Dame. I would like to thank William
Marshall and Richard Myers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article
and my student assistants, Marc Frumer, Myrna Shuster, and Marjorie Tasin, for their
valuable research assistance.
176 N.E.2d 761 (11. 1961).
The stream of commerce theory has also been applied in contexts other than
products liability actions. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137
(7th Cir. 1975) (patent infnngement); Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175
(2d Cir. 1967) (libel); Triple A Partnership v. MPL Commumcations, Inc., 629 F Supp.
1520 (D. Kan. 1986) (copyright infringement); Process Church of Final Judgment v.
Sanders, 338 F Supp. 1396 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (same); O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F Supp. 706
(D.R.I. 1988) (illegal disposal of hazardous wastes).
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in the distribution chain. 3 Jurisdiction on this basis has been
justified by the legal and econonuc benefits those manufacturers
and distributors derive from the indirect sale of their products
in the forum4 and by the belief that due process does not require
that these entities be permitted to escape the state's reach "by
[the use of intermediaries] or by professing ignorance of the
ultimate destination of [their] products."
'5
A common formulation 6 of the theory and its wide accep-
tance suggest some common understanding of its proper scope
and application, as well as uniform results. Yet the lower courts'
decisions, surprisingly, indicate uncertainty rather than unifor-
mity 7 And the Supreme Court's only contribution to the stream
of commerce discussion, prior to the 1986 Term, has reinforced
rather than reduced the prevailing confusion.'
I See Stephenson v. Duriron Co., 401 P.2d 423, 429 (Alaska), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 956 (1965); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 458 P.2d 57, 64, 80 Cal. Rptr.
113, 120 (1968); Metal-Matic, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 415 P.2d 617, 619
(Nev. 1966).
4 See Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 766; Poyner v. Erma Werke GMBH, 618 F.2d 1186,
1190 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Buckeye Boiler, 458 P.2d at 64, 80
Cal. Rptr. at 120; see also Note, The Long-Arm Reach of the Courts Under the Effect
Test After Kulko v. Superior Court, 65 VA. L. REv 175, 179 (1979); -Case Comment,
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: The Stream of Commerce Doctrine, Barely
Alive But Still Kicking, 76 GEo. L.J. 203, 205 (1987).
DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981); see also Sousa v. Ocean Sunflower Shipping Co., 608 F
Supp. 1309, 1313 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
6 The courts have articulated the stream of commerce test in terms of defendant's
"knowledge," "reason to know," or ability to "foresee" that its product will reach the
forum. See Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1969) ("The
present trend is to hold that a corporation is answerable where it introduces its
product into the stream of interstate commerce if it had reason to know or expect that
its product would be brought into the state where the injury occurred."); Volkswagen-
werk, A.G. v. Klippan, 611 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1980) ("When a manufacturer
voluntarily places its product in the general stream of commerce without restriction, the
'mimmum contact' requirement is satisfied in all forums where it is foreseeable to the
manufacturer that the product may be marketed."), cert. denied sub nom. Klippan v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 449 U.S. 974 (1980); see also Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd.
v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969). Prior to 1987, the Supreme Court
similarly referred to the standard in terms of defendant's "expectation." See World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (stating that a state may
constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a corporation "that delivers its products into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in
the forum State").
See infra notes 64-127 and accompanying text.
See Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297-98 (dictum); infra notes 95-127 and accompanying
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Asahi Metal Industry Co. v Superior Court,9 decided in
1987, offered the Supreme Court the opportumty to reassess the
constitutional basis of the stream of commerce theory and to
define with some precision those circumstances in which the
theory provides an appropriate basis for jurisdiction. In this
regard, however, Asahi proved to be a disappointment. Not only
did the Court fail to resolve the differences among the lower
courts, but the Asahi decision revealed sharply divergent views
among the justices with respect to the constitutional dimensions
of a proper stream of commerce theory 10
This Article argues that, while in the short term Asahi serves
only to prolong the current confusion, in the long-term the
decision should prompt a much needed re-examination of the
stream of commerce theory and its constitutional basis. That
examination should reveal that the current stream of commerce
analysis is mconsistent with the constitutional values protected
by personal jurisdiction analysis. As this Article suggests, a
stream of commerce theory consistent with those values must
acknowledge the existence of sovereignty limitations on a state's
authority to assert jurisdiction and require, as a consequence of
those limitations, a purposeful connection between the defendant
and the forum.
Section I of this Article discusses the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Asahi. Section II traces the development of the stream
of commerce theory, from its origin m the 1960s to Asahi, and
indicates the problems associated with its application. Section
III discusses both the immediate and future impact of Asahi
with respect to the stream of commerce theory Part A describes
the lower courts' attempts to apply the stream of commerce
theory after Asahi. Part B discusses the values underlying a
text; see also Dessem, Personal Jurisdiction After Asahi: The Other (International) Shoe
Drops, 55 TENN. L. REv 41, 51-57 (1987) (discussing confusion and disagreement of
federal courts regarding stream of commerce doctnne after Woodson); Hay, Judicial
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Constitutional Limitations, 59 U. CoLO. L. REv 9, 18
(1988) (noting lack of clarity m stream of commerce approach envisioned by Court in
Woodson); Case Comment, supra note 4, at 211-15 (describing division among lower
courts in post-Woodson stream of commerce cases).
9 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
1o See infra notes 11-48 and accompanying text.
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constitutional stream of commerce analysis and offers a revised
approach that more properly implements those values.
I. THE ASAHI CASE
In 1978, while driving on a California highway, Gary Zurcher
lost control of his motorcycle and collided with a tractor rig.
Zurcher was severely injured in the collision; his wife, a passen-
ger, was killed. Zurcher filed a products liability action m Cal-
iforma state court, alleging that the accident had been caused
by the sudden explosion of the rear motorcycle tire and that the
tire, tube, and sealant were defective. Among the defendants
named in Zurcher's complaint was Cheng Shin Rubber Industnal
Co., Ltd. ("Cheng Shin"), the Taiwanese manufacturer of the
tube. Cheng Shin, in turn, sought indemnity from its co-defen-
dants and from various third-party defendants, including Asahi
Metal Industry Co., Ltd. ("Asahi"), the Japanese manufacturer
of the tube's valve assembly Thereafter, the plaintiff and the
defendants settled the primary action, leaving only the third-
party claims to be resolved."
Asahl moved to quash service of summons, claiming that
California's assertion of jurisdiction over it would violate due
process. Although Asahi's only contact with California arose
from its sale of components to Cheng Shin, in Taiwan, that
were incorporated in products subsequently sold in California,
the trial court denied the motion. 12 In so ruling the court relied
on the number of valve assemblies sold by Asahl to Cheng Shin
during the previous five years, the number of Asahi valve assem-
blies sold in Califorma, 13 the substantial percentage of Cheng
Shin's United States sales that occurred in California, and Asa-
hi's awareness that valve assemblies sold to Cheng Shin would
be incorporated in products ultimately sold in California.
4
1, Asahu Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1029-30 (1987).
12 Zurcher v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co., No. 76180 (Super. Ct., Solano Cty, Cal.
Apr. 20, 1983) (Order Denying Motion to Quash Summons), cited in Asahi, 107 S. Ct.
at 1030.
,3 From 1978 to 1982 Cheng Shin purchased 1,250,000 valve assemblies from Asahi.
These sales constituted 1.24 percent and 44 percent of Asahi's 1981 and 1982 sales,
respectively. In addition, Asahl also sold its components to other manufacturers that
sold tire tubes in California. See Asaht, 107 S. Ct. at 1030.
14 Id.
[VoL. 77
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The appellate court reversed, 15 concluding that the "ulti-
mately realized foreseeability that the product into which [Asa-
hi's] component was embodied would be sold all over the world
including California" was not the kind of foreseeability that
would satisfy constitutional standards. 16 The California Supreme
Court, however, upheld the trial court's conclusion. 17 While
acknowledging that "Asahl hald] no offices, property or agents
in California," "solicit[ed] no business and made no
direct sales [t]here,' ' 18 the court found that Asahi had purpose-
fully introduced its products into the stream of commerce. Ac-
cording to the court, the Supreme Court had approved jurisdiction
under the stream of commerce theory "where the defendant
expects its products to be sold in the forum state."' 9 This cn-
tenon was satisfied in the circumstances before it, the court
concluded, because Asahi was aware that its products would be
incorporated into products ultimately sold in California. This
knowledge, in conjunction with the substantial indirect business
Asahl did in California, supplied the forum-defendant contacts
sufficient to satisfy the nummum contacts standard. 20
11 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr. 741 (Ct. App. 1983),
vacated, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1985).
6 Asahi, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 744. The court further held that it would be "unfair"
to require Asahi, a component manufacturer whose sales to Cheng Shin constituted
"only a small part of [its] trade," to defend in California. Id.
'7 Asahl Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1985), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
11 Id. at 549, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
19 Id. at 552, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
Id. at 549-50, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 394. The court also found that California's
assertion of jurisdiction was "fair" and "reasonable" in light of California's interest in
assuring the compliance of foreign manufacturers with the state's safety standards, its
interest as the situs of the evidence, and Cheng Shin's interest in suing all cross-
defendants in one forum, thereby avoiding possible inconsistent verdicts. Id. at 553, 216
Cal. Rptr. at 395-96.
Justice Lucas dissented from both conclusions. With regard to the stream of
commerce issue, he argued that the majority had confused foreseeability with intent.
The fact that Asahi could foresee that some of its valves would be sold in California
did not constitute its purposeful avallment of forum benefits, and the evidence did not
indicate any intent by Asalu to serve the California market. In fact, the absence of such
intent was apparent from the small percentage of revenues Asalh derived from California
sales. Id. at 554-55, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 396-97. Similarly, California's assertion of
jurisdiction was "unfair." Any interest California had in the case disappeared once
plaintiff had settled and Cheng Shin and Asahi clearly had no expectations that their
relationship would be governed by California. Id. at 555, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
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Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted certi-
orari to consider whether a manufacturer's "mere awareness"
that components "manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the
United States would reach the forum state in the stream of
commerce constitutes 'minimum contacts' between the defendant
and the forum state .,"21 and reversed. 2 The Court's decision,
however, did not rest on its resolution of the stream of commerce
issue. Instead, eight justices23 agreed that, whether or not Asahi
had those minimum contacts with the forum that the due process
clause requires, California's assertion of jurisdiction in these
circumstances would "offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' "24 The Court based its conclusion on
an assessment of five factors: the burden that the defendant
would face in litigating in the forum, the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining effective relief, the interest of the forum state, " 'the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies' " and " 'the shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social poli-
cies.' " 25
In considering these factors, the Court recognized that liti-
gation in California would impose serious burdens on the defen-
dant, not only because that litigation would be conducted at a
substantial distance from Asahi's headquarters, but because Asahi
would be forced to defend itself in a foreign legal system. By
contrast, the Court found, the interests of Cheng Shin and
California were minimal. Cheng Shin was not a Califorma res-
ident but a citizen of Taiwan and the only claim remaining to
be resolved involved indemnification between a Japanese and a
Taiwanese corporation. The Court found no basis for concluding
that the litigation of this claim in California would be more
convenient for Cheng Shin. Similarly, given this procedural pos-
ture, California had no resident to protect and no other interest
21 Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1029.
22 Id. at 1031.
21 Justice Scalia did not join this portion of the Court's opimon.
24 Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1029 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
Id. at 1034 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980)).
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requiring its assertion of jurisdiction. Its interest in ensuring
compliance with its safety standards was arguably lessened by
the nature of the claim and by the fact that the appropriateness
of applying California law to that claim was unclear. That
interest was, moreover, adequately served by the pressure pur-
chasers subject to the application of California tort law would
apply to their component suppliers.
26
Finally, the Court considered the significance of the "inter-
state interests" factors in this international context. In such a
context, the Court concluded, "the procedural and substantive
policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the
assertion of jurisdiction by the California court" must be con-
sidered.27 Moreover, the Court cautioned, American courts must
be wary of imposing " 'our notions of personal jurisdiction,' "28
especially where the defendant's burden is severe and the inter-
ests of the forum and the plaintiff slight. 29 In the circumstances
here, namely the "international context," the serious burden
thrust on the defendant, and the minimal interests of the plaintiff
and forum, California's exercise of jurisdiction was "unreason-
able."3 0
Although the above analysis formed the basis of the Court's
decision, the justices nevertheless issued three opinions on the
stream of commerce issue. Justice O'Connor, in an opinion
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell, and Justice
Scalia, concluded that the mere act of placing a product in the
stream of commerce, even where the defendant is aware that the
stream of commerce will sweep its product into the forum, does
not constitute the minmum contacts between defendant and
forum required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3' The plurality noted that while some courts, like
the Supreme Court of California, had interpreted the Court's
comments m World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson 2 as
16 Id. at 1034.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
Id. at 1035 (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404
(1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
29 Id.
30 Id.
I1 d. at 1033.
3 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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authorizing an assertion of jurisdiction on that basis, the due
process clause required that the connection between defendant
and forum anse from "an action of the defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum State."13 3 The placement of a product
into the stream of commerce was not itself such an action nor
would the defendant's awareness that its products would ulti-
mately enter the forum mn the stream of commerce elevate the
constitutional significance of the defendant's action.3 4 Instead,
the plurality concluded, there must be some "[aidditional con-
duct of the defendant [manifestmg] an intent or purpose to serve
the market in the forum State." 35 The plurality cited as examples
of such conduct: advertising in the forum, designing the product
for the forum market, establishing channels for the regular
provision of advice to forum customers, and marketing the
product in the forum through a distributor-agent. Because there
was no evidence that Asahi had engaged in any such additional
conduct, the plurality found that Asahi lacked those mimmum
contacts necessary to justify California's exercise of jurisdic-
tion.3
6
A second opinion, written by Justice Brennan and joined by
Justices Marshall, White, and Blackmun, rejected the require-
ment of additional conduct as both unnecessary 7 and a "marked
retreat ' 3 from Woodson. In Woodson, Justice Brennan argued,
the Court had used the stream of commerce situation to illustrate
the type of foreseeability relevant to due process. Specifically,
the Court had contrasted the foreseeability of litigation in a state
in which the defendant's product was regularly sold, which
reflected constitutionally sufficient contacts between the defen-
dant and the forum, with the foreseeability of litigation in a
state to which a consumer had fortuitously transported the de-
fendant's product, which the Court found to be an insufficient
basis for jurisdiction. 39 In addition, Justice Brennan noted, the
3 Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033 (emphasis m original) (citing Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
3 Id.
3 Id.
36 Id.
3 Id. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
38 Id. at 1036.
39 Id. at 1037.
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Court in this illustration had referred to Gray, "a well-known
stream-of-commerce case" 4 in which an Illinois court had as-
serted jurisdiction over a component manufacturer whose sole
contact with the state was that its products were incorporated
into a final product sold in Illinois. On this basis, Justice Bren-
nan argued, Woodson must be interpreted as "preserving ' 41 the
stream of commerce theory
The Brennan opinion also dismissed the additional conduct
requirement as "unnecessary " The defendant who participates
in the "regular and anticipated flow of products ' 42 to the forum
benefits from the retail sale of the ultimate products in the
forum, both economically and, indirectly, from the forum's laws
regulating commerce-whether or not he engages in "additional
conduct." Moreover, Justice Brennan argued, "[a]s long as [he]
is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum
State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a sur-
prise."
43
In a third opinion, Justice Stevens pointed out that resolution
of the stream of commerce issue was unnecessary since the
Court's conclusion that Califorma's exercise of jurisdiction would
be "unreasonable and unfair" itself required reversal of the
state court decision. 4 Having said this, however, Justice Stevens
went on to assert that the test formulated by the O'Connor
plurality, even if appropriate, had been misapplied. 4 The ade-
quacy of the defendant's contacts with the forum cannot be
assessed, he argued, by reference to some "unwavering line"
between "mere awareness" and "purposeful availment. ' 46 In-
stead, that assessment will be affected by "the volume, the value
and the hazardous character of the components." 47 In this case,
he suggested, involving a "regular course of dealing that results
in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of
,"Id.
41 Id.
41 Id. at 1035.
43 Id.
" Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurnng in part and concumng in the judgment).
45 Id.
,6 Id.
47 Id.
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several years," ' 4 the defendant's contacts with the state would
be sufficient to satisfy due process demands.
II. TBE STREAM OF COMNMRCE THMORY- ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT
Any understanding of the justices' divergent views in Asahl
and the determination of the appropriate scope of a stream of
commerce theory must begin with some understanding of the
theory's origin and development. This section discusses the birth
of the stream of commerce theory, the legal and economic
framework in which it arose, and the development of the theory
until the Asahi decision. More specifically, this section sets forth
the division and confusion ansing almost from the theory's
inception and describes the Supreme Court's role in reinforcing
that confusion.
A. The Supreme Court: Pennoyer Through Hanson
The stream of commerce theory was an outgrowth of the
increasingly interstate character of the economy and the Supreme
Court's adoption of the minimum contacts test as the constitu-
tional measure of a state's power to assert personal jurisdiction.
Until 1945, the limits of that power were fixed by the dual
premises of Pennoyer v Neff"49 A state had exclusive jurisdiction
over those persons and property within its borders, and con-
versely, a state had no authority over persons or property outside
those boundaries. 50
41 Id. Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by Justices White and Blackmun, but
whether they agreed that resolution of the stream of commerce issue was unnecessary
or approved his stream of commerce remarks, or both, is unclear.
41 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer involved an action to recover possession of a tract
of land. In a prior action, J.H. Mitchell, an attorney, had sued Marcus Neff for fees
owing for services rendered. Mitchell obtained a default judgment against Neff, which
was subsequently satisfied by the sale of land owned by Neff in Oregon. Some years
later, Neff brought an action to recover his land from Pennoyer, a subsequent purchaser,
on the ground that the first judgment was invalid. Ultimately, the Supreme Court
agreed, finding that the Oregon court had lacked both in personam and quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction.
For an interesting discussion of the factual and legal circumstances of Pennoyer,
see Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and
Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. Rav 479 (1987).
10 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
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In the years following Pennoyer, the courts found this ap-
parently straightforward standard increasingly difficult to apply
The nation's commerce was evolving into an economy in which
the interstate movement of goods and services was common-
place. The growing economy had, in turn, produced a concom-
itant need for expanded jurisdiction over nonresidents that
Pennoyer's territonal-based standard could not fully accommo-
date.5' In fact, routine application of the standard had sometimes
resulted in unfair and absurd jurisdiction decisions. 52 To bridge
the ever-widening gap between the law and commercial economic
reality, the courts created certain fictions that allowed them to
introduce much-needed flexibility into the jurisdictional standard
while remaining ostensibly faithful to Pennoyer 53
The need for this type of judicial creativity was eliminated
when, in 1945, the Supreme Court reformulated its jurisdictional
standard in International Shoe Co. v Washington.54 In Inter-
national Shoe, the Court explained that a state's power to assert
jurisdiction over a person did not require its physical presence
within state boundaries; "presence" was merely a symbol for
those in-forum activities of the defendant sufficient to satisfy
11 The courts were able to achieve some accommodation of interstate interests
within the Pennoyer framework since the Court had there expressly sanctioned quasi-tn-
rem jurisdiction (see Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720) and had recogmzed certain exceptions
to its territorial precepts, such as the state's ability to require partnerships or associations
to consent to forum jurisdiction as a condition of doing business there. See id. at 734-
36. Yet as means of reaching nonresidents these concepts were clearly limited. A court's
exercise of quasi-m-rem jurisdiction, for example, depended on the fortuity of the
defendant's having assets or property located within the state.
12 See Grace v. McArthur, 170 F Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959); Peabody v.
Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217 (1870); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); see also
Ripple & Murphy, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: Reflections on the Road
Ahead, 56 NoTRE DmE LAW 65, 70 & n.39 (1980) (discussing this point and cited
cases).
51 See, e.g., Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts; From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U.
Cm. L. REv. 569, 573, 574-86 (1958) (noting courts' occupation "in filling the interstices
of the doctrines announced in [Pennoyer]" and discussing courts' application of doctrines
of consent, presence, and doing business); see also Hazard, A General Theory of State-
Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. Rav 241, 272-81 (discussing problems created by
Pennoyer and courts' struggle with Pennoyer principles); Ripple & Murphy, supra note
52, at 70 & nn.40-41.
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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the due process clause. 5 Accordingly, a state could assert juris-
diction over a defendant not present within the state if the
defendant had such minimum contacts with the state that suit
there would not "offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' "56
In 1957, the court confirmed the apparent expansiveness of
its new jurisdiction test in McGee v International Life Insurance
Co. 57 In McGee, the Court sustained California's exercise of
jurisdiction over a nonresident insurer whose only contact with
the state was the single contract with a California resident, which
was the basis of the suit. In reaching its decision the Court noted
a "clearly discernible"58 trend toward the liberalization of juris-
diction that the Court attributed, in part, to "the fundamental
transformation of our national economy, ' 59 and the substantial
diminution in the burden sustained by a nonresident defendant
owing to improved transportation and commumcation. 60
Just one year later, however, in Hanson v Denckla,61 the
Court sounded a clearly cautionary note. The substitution of the
SS Id. at 316-17.
56 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
- 355 U.S. 220 (1957). Plaintiff in McGee was the beneficiary of an insurance
policy purchased by her son. Defendant was a Texas insurance company that had
assumed the obligations of the company from which the policy had originally been
purchased. Plaintiff's son, a California resident, accepted defendant's offer to insure
him and paid premiums to the defendant until is death. When defendant refused to
pay the proceeds of the policy to the beneficiary, she brought suit against defendant in
California state court. The Califorma court gave judgment for the plaintiff, and the
insurance company subsequently challenged the court's power to exercise personal juns-
diction over it.
5s Id. at 222.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 223.
61 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Hanson involved a dispute over the right to proceeds from
a trust established in Delaware by a Florida resident while domiciled in Pennsylvana.
The trust was administered by a Delaware trustee who continued to conduct trust business
and to correspond with the settlor regarding that business for several years after her
move to Florida. When the settlor died, her will was probated in Florida. Certain of
her legatees claimed the right to trust proceeds and sought a declaratory judgment to
that effect from a Florida court. The court granted the requested relief but without
obtaining personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee, deemed an indispensable party.
Meanwhile, the executrix of the settlor's estate instituted a parallel action in Delaware
state court. The Delaware court refused to award the Florida judgment full faith and
credit on the ground that the Florida court lacked jurisdiction over the trustee and ruled
that the trust proceeds were properly paid to the trustee and the appointees.
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flexible minimum contacts standard for Pennoyer's presence test,
it warned, did not signal an end to all restrictions on the personal
jurisdiction of state courts. Because the restrictions imposed by
the due process clause were "a consequence of territorial limi-
tations on the power of the respective States," 62 as well as a
protection against inconvenient litigation, due process required
that the defendant have the requisite minimum contacts with the
forum, though the defendant's burden of defending there be
minimal or non-existent. Moreover, the Court emphasized, such
contacts could not be supplied by the "unilateral activity" of
others, but must instead arise from "some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus, invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws. ' 63
B. Gray and its Progeny
The problems created by the Pennoyer standard were partic-
ularly felt in actions arising out of defective products. Not only
were injury-causing goods regularly shipped across state lines,
but the distribution systems by which these goods reached a state
were becoming substantially more sophisticated, involving nu-
merous intermediaries in various states.
" Id. at 251.
63 Id. at 253. Applying these principles in Hanson, the Court concluded that Florida
could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee. Although the
settlor, as a Flonda resident, had corresponded with the trustee with respect to trust
administration matters for some years pnor to her death and had also exercised her
power of appointment regarding the trust in Florida, the Court found these connections
with the state insufficient to justify its assertion of jurisdiction. The Court pointed out
that, unlike McGee, the trust had no "substantial connection" with the state, since the
trust had been established in Delaware, and any connection with Florida arose only after
the settlor moved to Florida and began to receive trust income there. Moreover, the
Delaware defendant, unlike the defendant in McGee, had performed no acts in the
forum that could constitute the requisite minimum contacts. Defendant had neither
conducted nor solicited business in Florida, and its correspondence with the settlor and
her exercise of the powers of appointment were "unilateral" acts of the settlor, not the
defendant. Id. at 252-53.
Justice Black, in dissent, emphasized the Florida court's holding that the appoint-
ment was ineffective and concluded that Florida's interest in the validity of the appoint-
ment should have been sufficient to sustain its exercise of jurisdiction. Moreover, he
argued that assertion of jurisdiction would not have been unfair to the defendant since
it chose to maintain its business relationship with the settlor during her residence in
Flonda. Id. at 258-60 (Black, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court's creation of the minimum contacts stan-
dard plainly offered some relief; courts could assert jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants as long as the contacts of those
defendants with the forum were sufficient to satisfy the standard.
Yet the Court's application of its new test offered little guidance
as to the nature of the acts or directness of the connection
necessary to constitute such contacts in the products liability
context. Particularly disturbing (and confusing) to the lower
courts was the Court's apparent contraction, in Hanson, of a
state's authority to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents. Han-
son's emphasis on the defendant's purposeful forum acts threat-
ened to elimnnate the state's ability to reach those defendants
who did not act directly in the forum.64 Left unanswered was
the extent to which Hanson, a case involving the validity of a
trust, might be legitimately distinguished from the products lia-
bility context or, more helpfully, interpreted in a fashion that
would enable courts to reach nonresident manufacturers whose
injury-causing products entered the forum indirectly
In 1961, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Gray v American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. ,65 the
case from which the stream of commerce theory originated.
Plaintiff Phyllis Gray, an Illinois resident, had been injured
when a water heater she had purchased there exploded, allegedly
as a result of a defective valve. The plaintiff brought suit in
Illinois state court against the manufacturer of the water heater
and Titan Valve Manufacturing Company, the Ohio manufac-
turer of the allegedly defective valve.
The Illinois Supreme Court sustained the state's assertion of
jurisdiction over Titan, although the manufacturer's only appar-
ent contact with Illinois was that a single valve, manufactured
and sold in Ohio and incorporated in the water heater in Penn-
sylvania, had reached an Illinois consumer "in the course of
6 See Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F 533, 548 ("It is certainly a permissible reading of Hanson
that the defendant or its agent must be physically present in order to 'conduct activities'
in the State "); see also Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 413 P.2d 732,
735-37 (Ariz. 1966) (noting courts' concern with regard to impact of Hanson's purposeful
forum acts requirement for products liability cases).
5 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
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commerce." The court concluded that such use of the defen-
dant's products was itself sufficient to satisfy the minimum
contacts standard; that is, a manufacturer could reasonably be
required to defend an action arising out of alleged defects in its
products wherever they were used "in the ordinary course of
commerce."67
The basis for this conclusion was notable in three respects.
First, in reaching its decision the Illinois court emphasized the
trend toward the expansion of jurisdiction and the change in
judicial attitudes since the time of Pennoyer The relevant focus
in jurisdictional analysis had shifted from notions of territorial
or physical power to concepts of adequate notice and the "con-
venient" forum, the place at which the parties could most con-
vemently settle their dispute. 68 Similarly, the quantity of the
defendant's forum contacts was not dispositive of the forum's
authority to exercise jurisdiction; rather, a single act or trans-
action with a "substantial connection" to the forum would
support an assertion of jurisdiction. 69
Second, Gray noted the importance of recognizing changing
realities, both economic and otherwise, in applications of the
jurisdiction standard. 70 The realities were that improved com-
mumcations and travel had substantially dirmnshed the burden
of defending in a distant forum, and that advanced methods of
distribution and doing business "hald] largely effaced the eco-
nomic significance of State lines." '71 These advances meant that,
"Id. at 764.
67 Id. at 766.
" Id. at 765.
9Id. at 764.
70 The court explained:
Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about by
technological and economic progress, jurisdictional concepts which may
have been reasonable enough in a simpler economy lose their relation to
reality, and injustice rather than justice is promoted. Our unchanging
principles of justice, whether procedural or substantive in nature, should
be scrupulously observed by the courts. But the rules of law which grow
and develop within those pnnciples must do so in the light of the facts of
economic life as it is lived today. Otherwise the need for adaptation may
become so great that basic rights are sacrificed in the name of reform, and
the principles themselves become impaired.
Id. at 766.
71 Id.
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although manufacturers rarely dealt directly with their custom-
ers, those manufacturers derived benefits from these expanded
distribution systems .72
Under these standards, Illinois was an appropriate forum.
By selling its products for use in other states, Titan may have
directly enjoyed the benefits and protections of Illinois law and,
in any event, benefited from the protection that law afforded to
the marketing of the hot water heaters in which defendant's
valves were incorporated. That such benefits were indirect merely
reflected the realities of modern distribution; the indirectness of
those benefits in no way lessened their significance to the conduct
of defendant's business.
73
Illinois was also the most convenient forum. The plaintiff
was an Illinois resident and had sustained her injury there.
Illinois law, the court concluded, would govern the substantive
issues and, because Illinois was the place of the injury, witnesses
relevant to several important issues were likely to be found
there. 74
Third, and finally, the court was clearly untroubled by the
absence of record evidence regarding Titan's intent to market its
goods in Illinois or the volume or geographic scope of Titan's
business or that of the water heater manufacturer. The court
stated that Titan had not asserted that its product's presence in
Illinois as a result of its incorporation in a hot water heater was
"an isolated instance" and found, without further explanation,
that it was "a reasonable inference that [Titan's] commercial
transactions, like those of other manufacturers, result in sub-
stantial use and consumption in this State." 75 The court then set
forth the following "general proposition". "[I]f a corporation
elects to sell its products for ultimate use in another State, it is
2 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 766-67.
71 Id. at 766. In addition, the court stated that defendant's products were "pre-
sumably sold in contemplation of use here." Id. Professor Cume has suggested that by
this statement the court was not ignoring the absence of proof regarding defendant's
contemplation of the use of its products in Illinois. Instead, he indicates, the court was
saying that where a manufacturer produces components for water heaters marketed in
the United States, that manufacturer should be presumed as a matter of law to have
contemplated their use there. Currie, supra note 64, at 552.
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not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage caused
by defects in those products.
'76
The attractions of Gray's stream of commerce theory were
immediately apparent to the lower courts. The theory provided
a basis for satisfying the increasing jurisdictional needs created
by sophisticated distribution systems while reconciling the poten-
tially conflicting demands of Hanson and McGee.
Unsurprisingly, then, a large number of courts after Gray
concluded that jurisdiction could be properly asserted over a
manufacturer whose product caused injury m the forum if its
presence there was "foreseeable." Under this standard, as lib-
erally interpreted, jurisdiction was upheld not only over manu-
facturers who intentionally marketed their products in the forum
but over manufacturers who merely knew or should have known
that their products would or could reach the forum. 7 Similarly,
stream of commerce analysis was applied, without distinction or
discussion, to component as well as final product manufacturers;
after all, Gray itself had involved a component manufacturer,
and that court had apparently found that defendant's status
offered no basis for restraint. 78 Nor did the courts hesitate, in
most cases, to apply the theory to foreign producers. Despite
the typically larger burden foreign defendants would bear in
defending in an American forum, most courts either ignored
that fact or found it non-dispositive of the jurisdiction issue.
7 9
Gray's tenets were not, however, universally accepted. Some
courts refused to permit jurisdiction on the basis of the presence
of only a few products in the forum, requring instead proof
that the defendant had received "substantial" benefits from the
76 Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
See Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969); Buckeye Boiler
Co. v. Superior Court, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Winston Indus., Inc. v.
Dist. Court, 560 P.2d 572 (Okla. 1977).
71 Compare, e.g., Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970)
(sale of final products) with International Harvester Co. v. Hendrickson Mfg. Co., 459
S.W.2d 62 (Ark. 1970) and Metal-Matic, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 415 P.2d
617 (Nev. 1966) (sale of components).
7See Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969)
(English coach manufacturer); Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 155 (Ill. 1979)
(Belgian tire manufacturer), cert. dented, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980).
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forum. 0 Gray's analysis was also rejected by the Eighth Circuit,
but on an entirely different ground-that the presence of the
injury-causing product in the forum could not be attributed to
any intentional act by the defendant.
That Eighth Circuit case, Hutson v Fehr Bros., Inc.,81 was
in many ways a typical stream of commerce case. A product
sold by an Italian corporation had reached Arkansas through
the stream of commerce and there caused injury to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff brought suit, in Arkansas, against a number of
defendants, including the manufacturer of the product and the
Italian corporation that had resold the product. Yet the court
refused to sustain Arkansas' assertion of jurisdiction over the
Italian corporation on the basis of a stream of commerce theory
While acknowledging the impact of Gray and its followers, the
court pointed out that the defendant had not intentionally solic-
ited business in the forum, as required by Hanson, or exercised
any control over the decision of the British intermediary to
market the product in Arkansas.1
2
Perhaps more surprising than the existence of dissent was
the confusion and division among those who purported to accept
and apply a stream of commerce concept. The general acceptance
of the theory, and its expression in a common standard, effec-
tively masked the courts' uncertainty as to the theory's proper
scope and application. The courts readily identified the following
factors as relevant to stream of commerce analysis: the defen-
dant's role in the distribution system, the defendant's receipt of
substantial benefits from the forum, and the defendant's ability
to foresee that its products would reach the forum. However,
the courts experienced substantial difficulty in determning the
relative significance of these factors and their appropriate inter-
play
o See Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir.
1964); Chunky Corp. v. Blumenthal Bros. Chocolate Co., 299 F Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); see also Hodge v. Sands Mfg. Co., 150 S.E.2d 793 (W Va. 1966).
-1 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978).
12 Id. at 837. The Hutson court explicitly rejected Arkansas' interest in providing
a forum for its injured restdent as a basis for jurisdiction in the absence of adequate
contacts. The court also emphasized the burden defendant faced in defending itself in
litigation in the United States. Id.
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A number of courts, echoing Gray's expansive view of juns-
diction and focus on convenient forum, interpreted Gray at its
broadest. For these courts, the presence of a single injury-causing
product in the forum was a sufficient basis for personal juris-
diction over the manufacturer 83 Like Gray, many of these courts
saw jurisdiction theory as moving toward a convenient forum
focus. 84 And even those that did not explicitly note this trend
often cited the convenience of the forum in support of their
finding of jurisdiction.
85
Moreover, as these courts viewed it, manufacturers naturally
seek to market their goods in as many fora as possible and
derive economic and legal benefits from that activity The pres-
ence of products in any forum in the United States would,
therefore, be both foreseeable and beneficial.8 6 Consequently,
only if the defendant manufacturer could establish that its prod-
uct's presence in the forum was "fortuitous" or "unforeseeable"
should personal jurisdiction be deemed to violate due process.
87
83 See Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of Am., 454 P.2d 63 (Idaho 1969); Andersen
v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 135 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1965); Ehlers v. United States
Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 124 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1963).
" See Metal-Matic, 415 P.2d at 619 (noting that despite certain statements in
Hanson, "the spirit of Pennoyer is almost buried" and that "[i]t appears that the
attractions of the most convenient forum will eventually be the jurisdictional test to be
applied"); International Harvester, 459 S.W.2d at 65 (noting emphasis on "adequate
notice and opportunity to defend" rather than territorial limitations and citing as the
criteria for jurisdiction "the more practical considerations of justice, convenience, and
reasonableness in the particular case"); see also Winston Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d at 574
(citing Gray's emphasis on a convenient forum for both parties).
s1 See, e.g., Mann v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., 361 So. 2d 1021, 1026 (Ala. 1978);
see also Duignan v. A.H. Robins Co., 559 P.2d 750, 754 (Idaho 1977).
" See Andersen, 135 N.W.2d at 643; Ehlers, 124 N.W.2d at 827; see also Com-
ment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product Liability
Actions, 63 MICH. L. RFv. 1028, 1031 (1965):
As far as the manufacturer's economic objectives are concerned, his over-
riding purpose is to have his product consumed. Where this consumption
occurs is relatively insignificant to him. This observation supports the
position that the manufacturer can be summoned to defend a cause of
action arising out of the use of his product wherever it may be located.
Id. (footnote omitted).
81 See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler, 458 P.2d 57, 64, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 120 (1969) (burden
lies on the defendant manufacturer to show that it has not, " 'as a matter of commercial
actuality,' " engaged in purposeful activity within the forum state) (quoting Empire
Steel Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 P.2d 502, 504, 17 Cal. Rptr. 150, 157 (1961) (emphasis
added in Buckeye Boiler)); see also Andersen, 135 N.W.2d at 643 (in which court stated
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These cases, however, offered little scope for a determnation
that the product's presence was fortuitous. Plainly, the absence
of proof that others of the defendant's products had been sold
or used in the forum was not enough. Nor were the courts, in
some instances, disturbed by the absence of proof that the
injury-causing product itself had reached the forum in the stream
of commerce.88 Jurisdiction was constitutional as long as the
defendant was a manufacturer and unable to show that the
distribution of its goods was so confined as to make its product's
presence in the forum completely unforeseeable.
Other courts, however, rejecting the presence of a single
product in the forum as an appropriate basis for jurisdiction,
adopted a more restrictive approach. These courts required that
the plaintiff offer proof of substantial use or purchase of the
defendant's products in the forum or proof that the nature of
the distribution system through which the defendant's products
were marketed made substantial use or purchase there foresee-
able. s9 Still other courts, while professing adherence to the single
tort concept, in fact took care to base their conclusions of
jurisdiction on other defendant-forum contacts (including those
that products are typically designed for sale in "whatever markets may be found for
them" and cited defendant's failure to counter the inference that its product was designed
for general rather than local use in support of a finding of jurisdiction over defendant);
Ehlers, 124 N.W.2d at 827 (in which court, upholding jurisdiction over the defendant,
emphasized the absence of any contention by defendant that the area of foreseeable use
excluded the forum and defendant's failure to negate "the reasonable inference" that
its product was mass-produced and intended for nationwide use).
11 See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler, 458 P.2d at 65-66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22. In this
case plaintiff, a California resident, was injured at his place of employment when a
pressure tank manufactured by defendant exploded. Although there was no evidence of
how plaintiff's employer obtained the tank or that any other such tanks were sold or
used in California, the court speculated that defendant could have sold the injury-causing
tank directly to plaintiff's employer or that one of the companies to which defendant
sold its products in the eastern United States had resold that tank (and others) for use
in California. See also Smith v. York Food Mach. Co., 504 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1972)
(junsdiction upheld on basis of stream of commerce theory although the machine in
question had been manufactured and sold to a subsidiary, which used it and then resold
the machine to the employer of the injured plaintiff).
11 See Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., Inc., 304 F Supp. 165 (D. Minn.
1969); Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Hodge,
150 S.E.2d 793.
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unrelated to the litigation), as well as on the presence of the
injury-causing product there.9°
The courts' uncertainty was not limited to the appropriate
weight and role of the economic benefits factor Substantial
confusion and disagreement also arose in those situations in
which the defendant was not the manufacturer but another actor
in the distribution chain and where the product's presence in the
forum was attributable to the actions of the plaintiff or one
other than a member of the distribution system. Some courts
readily concluded that stream of commerce analysis supported
jurisdiction over a manufacturer, even where the presence of its
product in the forum was due to the act of plaintiff or one
outside the distribution chain, as long as that act was foreseea-
ble.9' Where the defendant was a local seller, however, the
majonty of courts refused to subject the seller to jurisdiction
outside its local market. That refusal was attributable less to
any belief that the movement of the product to the forum was
the "unilateral" act of the plaintiff (or third party) than to a
90 See Buckeye Boiler, 458 P.2d at 61-62, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 117-18 (concluding that
defendant had purposefully availed itself of forum benefits through its direct sales of
somewhat similar products to a California customer-whether injury-causing product
actually reached the forum through the stream of commerce or was the subject of some
isolated forum transaction); see also Eyerly Aircraft, 414 F.2d at 595-98 (in which court
suggests that single tort could be sufficient basis for jurisdiction but upholds forum
jurisdiction on the basis of defendant's substantial, though unrelated, forum contacts,
as well as defendant's introduction of the injury-causing product into the stream of
commerce).
9, See Duignan, 559 P.2d 750; Feathers v. McLucas, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (App. Div.
1964), rev'd on statutory grounds sub nom. Longmes-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes
& Reinecke, Inc., 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19-24, 209 N.E.2d 68, 76-80, cert. denied sub nom.
Estwing Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Singer, 382 U.S. 905 (1965); see also Comment, supra note
86, at 1033-34 (arguing that it is not unfair to require a manufacturer to defend wherever
its products are used, even if not distributed in the forum, because "the manufacturer's
economic purposes are still being effectuated The manufacturer has taken the
initiative in marketing his product for public consumption and jurisdiction should be
sustained wherever Is product causes injury when it is being used for the purpose
for which it was designed." (footnote omitted)); cf. Eyerly Aircraft, 414 F.2d 591 (in
which court sustained junsdiction over Oregon manufacturer of amusement ndes whose
product was sold in Illinois and resold to North Dakota company that took the ride to
a number of states, including Texas, where it caused injury; court's holding based on
"dual grounds" that defendant had other amusement ride-related contacts with the
forum and had introduced its product into the stream of commerce "with reason to
know that the ride would probably eventually nomadize through the state." Id. at 597.).
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perceived distinction between manufacturers and retailers. 92 On
the other hand, other courts assigned no sigmficance to the
defendant's role in the distribution system, concluding that ju-
risdiction over even local sellers was constitutional as long as
the defendant could foresee the presence of its product in the
forum.93
Despite the confusion regarding the scope and constitution-
ality of stream of commerce analysis, 94 the Supreme Court did
not intervene to resolve this or, indeed, any personal jurisdiction
issue until 1977 As a result, the courts continued to apply the
stream of commerce theory, in uneven though generally expan-
sive fashion, as a basis for jurisdiction.
C. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson: Confusion
Reinforced
In the late 1970s the Supreme Court re-entered the personal
jurisdiction area, issuing in quick succession a series of jurisdic-
tion decisions that emphasized the constitutional limitations on
state court jurisdiction. In its restatement of these limitations,
the Court emphatically rejected the "convenient forum" as the
91 See Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 492 P.2d 624 (Colo. 1972);
Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 425 P.2d 647 (Wash. 1967); see also Developments
in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv L. Rv 909, 929-30 (1960) (suggesting
that jurisdiction should be upheld where the defendant is a manufacturer whose goods
reach the forum as a result of the distribution system but not where defendant is a
retailer whose goods reach the forum because the consumer takes them there; distinction
is based on manufacturer's larger scope of business and on greater degree of harm to
which the manufacturer subjects forum residents).
1, See Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F Supp. 1205 (D.N.J. 1974); see
also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978), discussed
infra notes 95-127 and accompanying text.
14 A few courts also found the nature of the product relevant to the jurisdictional
inquiry in this context either because the nature of the product made its use in the
forum more foreseeable (see, e.g., Eyerly Aircraft, 414 F.2d at 597) or because a lesser
volume of "inherently dangerous" products would count more heavily in the mimmum
contacts calculus. See Velandra, 336 F.2d at 298; see also Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal
Prods. Corp., 218 F Supp. 524, 528 (D. Minn. 1961) (no suggestion that sale of electric
fryer to forum wholesaler has serious economic impact or poses physical danger to
Minnesota citizens; authority of state to exercise jurisdiction in this context is unlike
state's authority with respect to use of forum highways by nonresident drivers of
"dangerous instrumentalities").
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constitutional basis for jurisdiction 95 and dismissed as well the
sufficiency of the defendant's passive receipt of benefits from
the forum.96 Instead, the Court reiterated its analysis in Hanson:
the focus of jurisdictional analysis was the defendant's connec-
tion with the forum. Moreover, that connection must be estab-
lished by contacts arising from the defendant's purposeful acts
in the forum. 97
The Court's 197798 and 197899 decisions had no apparent
impact on the lower courts' application of stream of commerce
11 Woodson, 444 U.S. at 294 (due process clause requires relationship between
defendant and the forum, even if litigation in the forum is not inconvement for defen-
dant, forum is most convenient location for litigation, and forum has strong interest in
applying its law to the underlying dispute); see also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S.
84, 92 (1978) (noting that while the plaintiff's and forum's interests were to be consid-
ered, focus of jurisdiction analysis is defendant-forum connection).
9 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215-16 (1977) (defendants' receipt of
benefits establishes only that forum law may apply; "[i]t does not demonstrate that
[defendants] have 'purposefully avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of conducting activ-
ities within the forum State.' ") (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
9 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327-29, 332-33 (1980); Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92-
96; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 & 215-16.
- Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186. Shaffer involved a shareholder's derivative suit in a
Delaware state court. Plaintiff there charged that defendants, directors of the corporation
of which plaintiff was a shareholder, had breached their fiduciary duties. Jurisdiction
over the nonresident defendants was obtained pursuant to a Delaware statute that
permitted the sequestering of defendant's property in the state. The Supreme Court held
that the sequestered stock did not itself provide an adequate basis for Delaware's
assertion of jurisdiction over the directors. Instead, the Court held that all assertions of
jurisdiction, whether in personam or in rem, must satisfy the mimmum contacts standard.
Applying this standard, the Court concluded that defendants lacked the necessary conn-
nection with the forum. They had had nothing to do with the state and no reason to
expect to be haled into court in Delaware. The fact that Delaware law afforded benefits
to corporate directors might justify application of Delaware law to the action but
indicated no act by which defendants purposefully availed themselves of those benefits.
19 Kulko, 436 U.S. 84. In Kulko, a California resident brought suit in California
seeking custody and child support from her former husband, a resident of New York.
Under a previously negotiated agreement, the children had lived with their father in New
York during the school year and with their mother during school vacations. The older
child subsequently expressed a desire to live with her mother and, her father acquiescing,
moved to California. Some time later, the younger child also indicated his desire to live
with his mother, and she sent him a plane ticket for that purpose. Thereafter, the
mother instituted a custody and support action in California state court. The father
challenged the court's authority to assert jurisdiction over him, arguing that he lacked
the requisite minmum contacts with California. The Supreme Court agreed. While
acknowledging California's substantial interests in the lawsuit and plaintiffs interest in
litigating in the forum, the Court found that defendant's acquiescence in his children's
desire to live with their mother and any financial benefit he derived from their absence
did not constitute purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of the forum.
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analysis. These decisions (involving quasi-n-rem jurisdiction and
child support, respectively) were factually dissimilar from the
typical stream of commerce scenario, and the courts drew no
larger conclusions from the Court's reaffirmation of Hanson.1i °
In 1980, however, the Court addressed a personal jurisdiction
issue in the products liability context and, more significantly,
specifically considered the appropriate role of foreseeability in
personal junsdiction analysis.
The plaintiffs in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp v
Woodsonoi had been severely injured when, while driving through
Oklahoma, their car was hit from the rear and burst into flames.
The plaintiffs brought suit in Oklahoma state court against Audi
NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, the German manufacturer;
Volkswagen of America, Inc., the importer; World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp., a regional distributor of Audis serving the New
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut markets; and Seaway Volk-
swagen, Inc., the New York dealer from which the plaintiffs
had purchased the car World-Wide Volkswagen and Seaway
challenged the Oklahoma court's jurisdiction, arguing that their
only contact with Oklahoma was that a car they had sold to the
'0 See Mann, 361 So. 2d at 1023-25 (neither Shaffer nor Kulko reviewed in
majority's decision; stream of commerce issue discussed in light of Gray and Duple
Motors); Connelly, 389 N.E.2d at 159-60 (discussing Shaffer as confirming the appli-
cation of International Shoe standard as test of jurisdiction and analyzing the stream of
commerce issue under Gray and Buckeye Boiler).
"I' Woodson, 444 U.S. 286. On that same day, the Court also decided Rush, 444
U.S. 320. Rush was a tort action brought by a Minnesota resident in Minnesota state
court. The action arose out of an automobile accident in which the plaintiff, then an
Indiana resident, and the defendant, also an Indiana resident, were involved. Although
the defendant had no contacts with Minnesota, the state court exercised junsdiction over
him on the basis of the obligation of his insurer, licensed to do business in Minnesota,
to defend. The Supreme Court rejected this type of quasi-n-rem jurisdiction as improp-
erly focusing on the contacts among the plaintiff, the insurer, the forum, and the
litigation rather than upon the connection among the defendant, forum and litigation
that due process required. Rush, 444 U.S. at 332-33. Defendant himself had no contacts
with the forum and the fact that defendant's insurer did business there revealed nothing
about the defendant's forum contacts. The Court stated: "[The insurer's] decision to
do business in Minnesota was completely adventitious as far as [the individual defendant]
was concerned. He had no control over that decision, and it is unlikely that he would
have expected that by buying insurance in Indiana he had subjected himself to suit in
any State to which a potential future plaintiff might decide to move." Consequently,
defendant had done nothing that indicated his purposeful availment of forum benefits.
Id. at 328-29.
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plaintiffs in New York had been taken by the plaintiffs to
Oklahoma where it exploded.
Applying a stream of commerce analysis, the Oklahoma state
courts found this contact a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 0 2
According to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the mobility of the
car would make its use in Oklahoma "foreseeable" to the de-
fendants. Moreover, given the retail value of the car and some
evidence that the defendants' goods were used "from time to
time" in Oklahoma, the defendants had derived substantial rev-
enue from the use of their products there. 0 3
The Supreme Court's rejection of this analysis was sigmficant
for the future of the stream of commerce theory in a number
of respects. First, in setting forth the relevant jurisdictional
standard, the Court reiterated that the scope of the state's con-
stitutional power to assert jurisdiction was principally measured
by the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum. This
mimmum contacts standard, the Court explained, performed two
"related, but distinguishable, functions" 104 it protected the de-
fendant against distant and inconvenient litigation and "act[ed]
to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system."' 0 5
While acknowledging that the need to protect the defendant
against inconvenient litigation had, in this age of advanced com-
munication and travel, substantially diminished, the Court em-
phasized that continued attention to state lines was impelled by
federalism concerns. The Court pointed out that each state, as
a sovereign entity, has the power to try certain causes in its
courts, and this sovereign power implies a limitation on the
sovereign power of its sister states. In light of such federalism
concerns, a state could be divested of its power to assert personal
jurisdiction although that state might have a substantial interest
"0 In unreported rulings the state district court rejected defendants' claim that the
state's exercise of jurisdiction over them was unconstitutional. Defendants then sought
a writ of prohibition against the district court in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. The
writ was denied. See Woodson, 585 P.2d at 355; see also Woodson, 444 U.S. at 289 &
nn.5-6.
103 Woodson, 585 P.2d at 354.
11 Woodson, 444 U.S. at 291-92.
' Id. at 292.
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in applying its law to the action and though trying the action
there posed little or no inconvenience to the defendant 1 °6
Second, the Court attempted to clarify the role of foreseea-
bility within this jurisdictional framework. The Court rejected a
defendant's ability to foresee injury in the forum as a basis for
jurisdiction, since if jurisdiction were permitted on that basis,
the seller would be subject to suit in any state to which the
chattel traveled. Instead, "the foreseeability critical to due
process analysis [is that the] defendant's conduct and connection
with the forum" be such that the defendant should foresee being
haled into court there. 07 Such anticipation should arise, the
Court stated, where the defendant has " 'purposefully avail[ed]
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State.' "108 Because that activity provides clear notice to the
defendant of its amenability to suit there, the defendant may
structure its conduct accordingly The Court explained:
Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor
such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occur-
rence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or
distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its
product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to
suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise
has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others.
The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due
Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a cor-
poration that delivers its products into the stream of commerce
with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers
in the forum State. Cf Gray v American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).10 9
In Woodson, however, there had been no attempt by either
defendant to market its cars in Oklahoma. Instead, jurisdiction
was asserted on the basis of "one, isolated occurrence .. the
fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in
New York to New York residents, happened to suffer an accident
"06 Id. at 293-94.
Mo Id. at 297
101 Id. (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
- Id. at 297-98.
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while passing through Oklahoma."110 That circumstance could
not itself supply the necessary contacts between defendant and
forum nor was its significance bolstered by the fact that the
defendants could foresee that the purchasers would take the car
to Oklahoma; that act was the "unilateral" act of the plaintiffs,
not the defendants."'
Similarly, the Court quickly dismissed the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that jurisdiction was warranted because the defendants had
derived substantial economic benefit from the use of their goods
in Oklahoma. Whatever revenue the defendants earned by virtue
of the fact that their products were capable of use in Oklahoma
was, from a jurisdictional standpoint, irrelevant. Financial ben-
efits accruing from such "collateral" relationships to the forum
would not themselves support jurisdiction but must, instead,
"stem from a constitutionally cogmzable contact.1112
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, in dissent, ar-
gued that Oklahoma's assertion of jurisdiction was constitutional
because the defendants had deliberately injected into the stream
of commerce a product that, by its very nature, gave the defen-
dants notice that they would be subject to suit outside their
market area."' The defendants had acted purposefully in choos-
ing to affiliate themselves with a nationwide network for mar-
keting and servicing automobiles and derived substantial benefits,
such as the maintenance of an interstate highway system, from
states outside their market area that enhanced the value of
defendants' business.'1 4 Moreover, the dissenters found no con-
stitutional basis for the majority's apparent distinction between
110 Id. at 295.
- Id. at 298.
112 Id. at 298-99.
M Id. at 306-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 314-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
id. at 318 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority had rejected, for jurisdictional
purposes, any distinction between an automobile and other chattels on the basis of the
automobile's "unique" mobility or its character as a "dangerous instrumentality." The
Court explained: "The 'dangerous instrumentality' concept was apparently never used
to support personal junsdiction; and to the extent it has relevance today it bears not on
jurisdiction but on the possible desirability of imposing substantive principles of tort
law such as strict liability." Id. at 297 n.11.
11 Id. at 306-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 314-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
id. at 318-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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foreseeable use and foreseeable resale," 5 or its distinction be-
tween a defendant manufacturer and defendant retailer. 1 6
An added dimension to Justice Brennan's dissent was his
attack on the mimmum contacts standard, both as protecting
against state overreaching-a function he rejected-and as an
appropriate determinant of the fairness of the forum. In Justice
Brennan's opinion, the extreme defendant focus characterizing
the rmnmum contacts standard was no longer necessary A
proper jurisdiction standard must, instead, attempt to assess the
actual burden that the defendant would experience in defending
in the forum and must look not only to the defendant's interests
but also to those of the forum and other parties to the litiga-
tion. "
7
Woodson did little to resolve and perhaps much to increase
existing confusion regarding the stream of commerce theory In
part this was due to Woodson's apparent"8 approval of the
stream of commerce theory without an accompanying definition
of its proper scope and, in part, because the basis of the Wood-
son decision itself was ambiguous. As a result, Woodson's pn-
mary impact was not on the substance of the stream of commerce
theory but on the form in which it was articulated and applied.
Thus, courts applying stream of commerce analysis after
Woodson emphasized the sigmficance of defendant's role in the
distribution system. As the courts interpreted Woodson, the
greater amenability of manufacturers and primary distributors
to jurisdiction was warranted because, unlike the actors at the
"I Id. at 306-07 & nn.10-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 315-16 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); id. at 318-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 307 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 299-301 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"' Commentators have reached different conclusions with regard to Woodson's
approval of Gray and the stream of commerce theory. Compare, e.g., Jay, "Minimum
Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REv.
429, 443 (1981) ("[e]xplicit sanction is bestowed on Gray") and Weintraub, Due Process
Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L.
REv 485, 501 (1984) (Woodson "endorsed" stream of commerce theory) with, e.g.,
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction,
1980 Sup. CT. REv 77, 94 n.78 (suggesting that in light of "cf." signal, it is "not
completely clear" that Gray was cited with approval.). See also Peterson, Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law Revisited, 59 U. COLO. L. REv 37, 49 (1988) (noting Woodson's
"apparent," though "qualified," approval of Gray).
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end of the distribution chain, manufacturers and primary dis-
tributors derived benefits from a larger number of fora. As one
court explained:
Such manufacturers and distributors purposely [sic] con-
duct their activities to make their product available for pur-
chase in as many forums as possible. For this reason, a
manufacturer or primary distributor may be subject to a par-
ticular forum's jurisdiction where a secondary distributor and
retailer are not, because the manufacturer and primary distrib-
utor have intended to serve a broader market and they derive
direct benefits from serving that market. 19
The courts similarly emphasized the sigmficance of defen-
dant's "expectation" that the product defendant placed in the
stream of commerce would reach the forum. It was that expec-
tation that put defendant on notice of its amenability to suit in
the forum and, correspondingly, gave it the ability to control
that amenability 120 Yet, this "expectation" differed not at all
from the courts' interpretation of foreseeability prior to Wood-
son. As before, the defendant need not have intended to market
its goods in the forum; it was sufficient that it knew or should
have known the product would reach the forum.' 2 1 Under this
standard, a defendant who was aware of the scope of its distri-
butor's market-within which the forum was included-or even
1" Nelson by Carson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1983)
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984); accord Giotis v. Apollo of the
Ozarks, Inc., 800 F.2d 660, 668 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1092 (1987);
Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Technology Corp., 744 F.2d 1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1984);
Taylor v. Umden Corp. of Am., 622 F Supp. 1011, 1014-15 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Myers
v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 600 F Supp. 977, 985-86 (D. Nev. 1984); Alabama
Power Co. v. VSL Corp., 448 So. 2d 327, 329 (Ala. 1984).
'0 See Plant Food Co-op v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp., 633 F.2d 155, 156-
57, 159 (9th Cir. 1980) (defendant's knowledge of product's destination enabled defen-
dant to control its amenability to jurisdiction); Charles Gendler & Co. v. Telecom Equip.
Corp., 508 A.2d 1127, 1138 (N.J. 1986); Myers, 600 F Supp. at 986; see also Nelson
by Carson, 717 F.2d at 1126 (indicating as "critical" to personal jurisdiction analysis
that defendant know or be aware that its product would reach the forum).
'2 One court explicitly concluded that there was no meaningful distinction between
"know" and "should have known" in determining whether the defendant has purpose-
fully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum. See Oswalt v.
Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 200 (5th Cir. 1980).
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merely that the product could be distributed in the forum was
subject to jurisdiction.
122
Woodson further confused the stream of commerce issues
by failing to clarify the basis of the particular question it pur-
ported to address. Was the presence of the Robinson's Audi in
Oklahoma "fortuitous" because the stream of commerce ter-
minated with the ultimate purchase? Or did the Court base its
finding on the absence of proof that a number of defendants'
Audis had reached Oklahoma? In light of that ambiguity, some
courts concluded that Woodson rejected jurisdiction in which
only use, rather than resale, in the forum was foreseeable.12
3
Other courts concluded that jurisdiction was appropriate as long
as the forum was within the scope of defendant's foreseeable
market, whether or not it reached the forum by the acts of one
outside the distribution chain. 124 Similarly, some courts refused
122 See Bean Dredging, 744 F.2d at 1082-83 (in which the court concluded that
defendant was aware that its product might reach the forum based on its president's
admission that its component products could end up anywhere); Glotis, 800 F.2d at 667;
Haley v. Wright Mfg. Co., 651 F Supp. 116, 120 (M.D. La. 1986); Myers, 600 F Supp.
at 986; see also Svendsen v. Questor Corp., 304 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Iowa 1981) (in which
court assumed that product's presence in the forum was foreseeable although record did
not disclose the geographic area of distribution or the defendant's knowledge thereof;
apparent basis for assumption was defendant's failure to refute the allegation that it
indirectly served the Iowa market and the geographic proximity of the forum to the
place of manufacture).
In many of these cases the court reached its conclusion, at least in part, on the
ground that the defendant had made no attempt to limit the sale or distribution of its
product. See Giotis, 800 F.2d at 667-68; Haley, 651 F Supp. at 119.
"I See Sousa v. Ocean Sunflower Shipping Co., 608 F Supp. 1309, 1313-14 (N.D.
Cal. 1984); Asahi, 702 P.2d at 549 n.3, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 391 n.3; see also Fidelity &
Casualty Co. v. Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440, 446 (10th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986) (although resale-use distinction not explicitly recognized,
sale to ultimate consumer and movement to forum deemed a unilateral act of the
plaintiff rather than the defendant); DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d
280, 285 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981). Commentators have similarly
interpreted Woodson as precluding junsdiction on the basis of foreseeable use. See Jay,
supra note 118, at 442-44; Wemtraub, supra note 118, at 502; Case Comment, supra
note 4, at 204 n.6.
124 See Giotis, 800 F.2d at 668 (in which court sustained junsdiction over Missouri
manufacturer whose product injured a Wisconsin plaintiff notwithstanding fact that
distribution and purchase occurred in Minnesota and products were transported by the
purchaser to Wisconsin; court concluded that although no sales of defendant's products
occurred in Wisconsin, forum was within distributor's sales area because distributor
advertised nationwide); Hednck v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir.
1982), discussed infra notes 269-70 and accompanying text; see also Falen v. Cervi
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to sustain the forum's assertion of jurisdiction where only a few
of defendant's products had been sold or resold in the forum,
concluding that these forum sales were insufficiently "substan-
tial" or "regular" to satisfy the mimmum contacts standard. 25
And perhaps most curiously, the Eighth Circuit continued
along its separate path. Apparently ignoring Woodson's stream
of commerce dicta, the Eighth Circuit upheld a district court's
refusal to assert jurisdiction over a Japanese component manu-
facturer whose component products regularly reached the United
States and, presumably, the forum. 126 Although the district court
acknowledged that manufacturer's ability to foresee its products'
presence in the forum, the court concluded that that foreseea-
bility could not sustain jurisdiction where the product was placed
in the American stream of commerce by the final product man-
ufacturer rather than by the component manufacturer and where,
as in Hutson, defendant lacked any intent to serve the forum
market. 127
Livestock Co., 585 F Supp. 627, 629 (D. Nev. 1984) (in which court upheld jurisdiction
over Oklahoma seller of cattle despite the fact that the seller's activities occurred solely
in Oklahoma and seller had no knowledge of the cattle's Nevada destination; court
concluded that defendant should have reasonably anticipated that some of the livestock
it sold would reach Nevada since cattle are customarily shipped great distances, and it
was in defendant's economic interest to serve the market for livestock outside Oklahoma).
'2 See Dalmau Rodriguez v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 781 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1986);
Chung v. NANA Dev. Corp., 783 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 948
(1986); see also Shanks v. Westland Equip. & Parts Co., 668 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir.
1982) (in which court distinguished the regular entry of defendant's products into the
forum from the fortuitous presence of a single auto in Woodson); cf. Max Daetwyler
Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 298-300 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
980 (1985) (mimmum contacts standard not met on basis of "sporadic" and "intermit-
tent" forum sales of foreign defendant's products by independent American distributor;
court suggests that a "tolerance for broad jurisdiction" is less reasonable where plaintiff,
as well as defendant, is a "multistate actor," and where the cause of action (patent
infringement), unlike the products liability context, reflects no "localized harm").
'16 See Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 727 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
Defendant was a Japanese company that manufactured car seats and their component
parts. These products were sold to Toyota Motor Company, in Japan, for incorporation
into its automobiles. Many of these cars, containing defendant's products, were shipped
to the United States and distributed through Toyota subsidiaries and distributors, as
well as through independent distributors and dealers. One such car, purchased by
plaintiffs, was involved in an accident in Iowa. Plaintiffs subsequently brought suit there
against a number of defendants in the distribution chain, including the automobile seat
manufacturer.
'1 Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 578 F Supp. 530, 532-33 (N.D. Iowa 1982),
aff'd per curiam, 727 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1984).
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III. THE STREAM OF COMMERCE THEORY AFTER ASAHI: A
REASSESSMENT AND SUGGESTED REVISED APPROACH
A. Asahi's Immediate Impact
The immediate effect of Asahi12 could well be minimal. The
Court's emphasis on the international context and, more signif-
icantly, on the absence of a forum plaintiff, distinguish Asahi
from the typical stream of commerce scenario. In fact, some
lower courts have been quick to dismiss Asahi's relevance on
this basis, either noting the absence of international interests or,
if present, finding them substantially outweighed by the interests
of the forum and its resident plaintiff. 29
Moreover, even to the extent lower courts purport to give
more substantial attention to Asahi, the justices' stream of com-
merce opinions offer little guidance and, indeed, tend to increase
the existing confusion. Not only do the opinions suggest two,
and possibly three, definitions of an appropriate stream of com-
merce theory, they raise, and leave unresolved, two subsidiary
issues: the constitutional distinction, if any, between foreseeable
purchase and foreseeable use'30 and the constitutional signifi-
cance of the nature of the product concerned.' 3 '
'" Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
'19 See Mason v. F Lli Luigi, 832 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1987), discussed infra notes
146-57 and accompanying text; Hall v. Zambelli, 669 F Supp. 753 (S.D. W Va. 1987),
discussed infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text; see also McBead Drilling Co. v.
Kremco, Ltd., 509 So. 2d 429 (La. 1987) (discussed infra note 145) (noting absence of
Asahi's "umque burdens" where defendant was not alien); Peterson, supra note 118, at
52 (suggesting that Asahi's precedential impact may be limited for these reasons).
110 See Hall, 669 F Supp. at 756; McBead, 509 So. 2d at 432 & n.6. Although in
Woodson the dissenting justices criticized the majonty for drawing just such a distinction,
Justice Brennan now argues that Woodson did not create a use/purchase distinction but
one based on regular versus isolated use. See Asaht, 107 S. Ct. at 1037 n.3 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and in the judgment): "But I do not read the decision in [Woodson]
to establish a per se rule against the exercise of jurisdiction where the contacts arise
from a consumer's use of the product in a given State, but only a rule against jurisdiction
in cases involving 'one, isolated occurrence [of consumer use, amounting to] the
fortuitous circumstance ' " (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)).
"I See Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 494 & n.10 (11th Cir. 1988), discussed
infra notes 158-73 and accompanying text. As previously noted, the Court in Woodson
specifically rejected the relevance of the nature of the product to the jurisdiction
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Though generally agreeing that the Supreme Court has fur-
ther "muddied the [stream of commerce] waters,' '132 the lower
courts have reached different conclusions regarding their obli-
gations in a stream of commerce situation after Asahi. Some
courts have applied Brennan's analysis because in the absence
of a clear Supreme Court position on the stream of commerce
issue, circuit precedent, typically espousing the theory expressed
by Justice Brennan, so requires3 3 or because the lower court
believes that, despite the lack of consensus in Asahi, the Supreme
Court's prior precedent, primarily Woodson, supports the Bren-
nan standard. 34 Other courts have applied the "narrower' '135
O'Connor standard, at least for purposes of deciding the partic-
ular case, on the theory that if that standard is met, the broader
Brennan standard is also necessarily satisfied. 36 Finally, lacking
determination. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 296 n. 11; see supra note 113. In citing the factor
as relevant to a stream of commerce theory, Justice Stevens has reopened the question
of the significance of the dangerous instrumentality concept. For a discussion of Justice
Stevens' opinion, see supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
"I Hall, 669 F Supp. at 754; accord Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d
370, 375 (5th Cir. 1987) ("The dimension of the 'stream of commerce' doctrine now
divides the Supreme Court."); Andrews Umv. v. Robert Bell Indus., Ltd., 685 F Supp.
1015, 1019 (W.D. Mich. 1988) ("[T]he Asahi court was deeply split with respect to
what constitutes minmum contacts under the so-called 'stream of commerce' analysis.").
3 See AG-Chem. Equip. Co. v. Avco Corp., 666 F Supp. 1010, 1015 (W.D.
Mich. 1987) ("Until the Supreme Court resolves the debate as to what constitutes
minimum contacts under the stream-of-commerce theory, it is incumbent upon this court
to follow the lead of Justice Brennan and the Sixth Circuit."); cf. Andrews Univ., 685
F Supp. at 1019 (suggesting that Sixth Circuit has, in fact, adopted the O'Connor
standard).
"14 See Hall, 669 F Supp. at 755-56. It has also been suggested that the Brennan
position may be supported by five of the justices. Batton v. Tennessee Farmers Mut.
Co., 736 P.2d 2, 7 (ArMi. 1987); cf. Morris, 843 F.2d at 493 n.5 (noting Justice Stevens'
apparent assumption "arguendo" of correctness of O'Connor position while not "dis-
count[ing] the correctness of the broader Brennan test").
Commentators have reached a similar conclusion. See Dessem, supra note 8, at 63-
64 (stating that "the Court apparently is prepared to endorse a fairly liberal stream of
commerce doctnne"); see also Peterson, supra note 118, at 53 (noting probabilities that
in usual stream of commerce situation, Brennan standard will prevail).
M See Morris, 843 F.2d at 493 n.5.
I" See id. In addition, one court has interpreted Asahi as adopting the O'Connor
standard and, applying that standard, found sufficient "additional conduct" to sustain
jurisdiction. That court, in Bohannon v. Honda Motor Co., 682 F Supp. 42 (D. Kan.
1988), stated that in Asahi the Supreme Court "reasoned that something more was
required than an awareness by defendant that its products would enter the forum state
in the stream of commerce. The defendant must take some action 'purposefully directed'
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any guidance from the Court, the lower courts have continued
to supply their own answers to the subsidiary questions and to
define their role, if any, in the stream of commerce calculus.
137
A discussion of some of the recent lower court decisions will
serve to illustrate the courts' attempts to reconcile the, at best,
conflicting signals sent by the Court.
In Hall v Zambelli,138 a West Virginia resident was injured
when fireworks exploded prematurely during a fireworks display
The resident brought suit in West Virginia against the Pennsyl-
vania business displaying the fireworks and the Japanese man-
ufacturer of the allegedly defective shell, Onda Enterprises, Inc.
("Onda"). Onda challenged West Virginia's assertion of juris-
diction, claiming that its only contact with the state was that its
product, sold to a Pennsylvania company in Pennsylvania, had
caused injury in West Virginia. In addition, Onda disclaimed
any knowledge of the particular display from which plaintiff's
injury arose. 1
39
The West Virginia court, after a careful examination of
Asahi, concluded that its exercise of jurisdiction over Onda was
consistent with Asaht and the requirements of due process. While
acknowledging that the justices' opinions "arguably leave in
doubt the continued viability of the stream-of-commerce theory
[, [n]evertheless the Supreme Court's endorsement of the theory
in [Woodson] taken together with the lack of consensus in Asahi
convinces tis Court that the theory continues to have preceden-
tial value."140
at the forum state." Id. at 44 (citation omitted) (quoting Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033);
see also CGB Marine Services Co. v. M/S Stolt Entente, - F Supp. - , -
(E.D. La. 1988) (apparently adopting O'Connor standard); Tomashevsky v. Komon
Printing Mach. Co., 691 F Supp. 336, 339 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (expressing agreement with
O'Connor plurality).
A second court has interpreted Asahi as renouncing the stream of commerce theory
but held, in the particular case, that the additional conduct required by Justice O'Con-
nor's standard was unnecessary to sustain the forum's assertion of jurisdiction in light
of the state's strong interest in the lawsuit and the hazardous nature of the product
involved. See O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F Supp. 706 (D.R.I. 1988), discussed infra note
173.
13 See O'Neil, 682 F Supp. at 717-18; Hall, 669 F Supp. at 756-57; McBead, 509
So. 2d at 431-33.
"1 669 F Supp. 753 (S.D. W Va. 1987).
131 Id. at 754-55.
,40 Id. at 756; see also Wessinger v. Vetter Corp., 685 F Supp. 769, 777 (D. Kan.
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The Hall court also distinguished the case before it from
Asahi, noting initially the shortness of the "stream." Hall was
not a case in which a component part ultimately reached some
remote and unanticipated market, but one in which the defen-
dant sold a finished product directly to an identified customer. 41
Onda, the court determined, was well aware of the scope of its
purchaser's operations and thus could expect to be haled into
courts outside Pennsylvania.' 42 Second, the plaintiff was a resi-
dent of the forum, and the accident out of which the claim
arose occurred there. Unlike the Asahi situation, West Virginia
had a substantial interest in the litigation and the plaintiff an
interest in a West Virginia forum.141
Finally, the court rejected a foreseeable use-foreseeable pur-
chase distinction. The fact that the product's presence in West
Virginia was attributable to the independent act of the Pennsyl-
vania corporation rather than Onda was of no constitutional
significance. This case was distinguishable from Woodson, the
court concluded, because of the interdependent relationship be-
tween Onda and its purchaser and the consequent economic
benefit Onda derived from the Pennsylvania company's display
of its products. The court explained: "The more markets Zam-
belli, the fireworks displayer, served, the more markets Onda,
the fireworks manufacturer, served."' 44 Conversely, the court
concluded, the "economic posture" of the retail dealer in Wood-
son was not in any way "enhanced" by the purchaser's travel
through Oklahoma. 141
1987) (reaching similar conclusion with regard to theory's validity in light of the fact
that the justices in Asaht were "evenly divided" and of the strong support for the theory
among courts and commentators).
"4 Id. at 756-57.
M Id. at 757.
143 Id.
Id. at 756.
', Id. The court in McBead, 509 So. 2d 429, also considered the relevance of the
fact that defendant-manufacturer's product had not arrived in the forum through the
stream of commerce but had been taken there by the purchaser. As in Hall, the McBead
court refused to find any constitutional significance in this fact and based its refusal on
the differences between the local retailer in Woodson and a manufacturer. While it
might be "basically unfair" to require a local retailer to answer in a remote state for
injury ansing from alleged design or manufactunng defects, the court saw no unfairness
in requinng the manufacturer to answer for those defects in any jurisdiction where its
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In a second case, Mason v F Li Luigi,146 the Seventh Circuit
purported to apply a stream of commerce analysis while virtually
ignoring the stream of commerce opinions in Asahi. In Mason,
an Illinois resident injured by an allegedly defective machine
brought suit in Illinois against the Italian manufacturer of the
machine. The manufacturer had no direct contacts with Illinois,
and its only indirect business in the forum consisted of machines
sold to the plaintiff's employer by a Maryland corporation acting
as the defendant's United States distributor. In addition to the
presence of its machines in Illinois, the defendant had also sent
an employee to Illinois to assist the Illinois employer in setting
up and servicing the machines.1 47 Moreover, the defendant had
specifically designed the machine for the Illinois employer.1
48
In light of these facts, the Seventh Circuit's decision that
Illinois could constitutionally assert jurisdiction over the Italian
partnership is not surprising. The defendant had clearly placed
its products, including the alleged injury-causing machine, in the
stream of commerce with the knowledge that they would reach
Illinois, thus satisfying the Brennan standard. 149 More impor-
tantly, however, in sending an agent to assist the employer and
designing the product specifically for the Illinois forum, the
defendant manifested an intent to market its products there that
product caused damage. McBead, 509 So. 2d at 432. Moreover, the court contrasted the
strength of the forum's interest in the manufacturer's case with the relatively smaller
interest of the forum when the local retailer was involved. Id. McBead gave little
consideration to Asahi's impact, merely stating that the justices disagreed with regard
to the dimeasions of the stream of commerce theory and emphasizing the insufficient
relationship among the Califorma forum, the Japanese defendant and the indemnification
issue. Id. at 433 n.7; cf. Smith v. Daimchl Kinzoku Kogyo Co., 680 F Supp. 847, 852-
53 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (Japanese manufacturer whose product reached California through
distribution chain was not subject to jurisdiction in Texas where product, transported
there by purchaser-employer, caused injury to Texas employee. Court, citing Woodson,
444 U.S. at 298, concluded that because the retailer served only the states of California,
Arizona, and Nevada, Japanese manufacturer had no expectation that its products would
be purchased or used by Texas consumers, and that employer's taking product to Texas
was its unilateral act.).
-- 832 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1987).
4 Id. at 384-86.
141 Id. at 385.
141 See Asaht, 107 S. Ct. at 1035-38 (Brennan, J., concurnng in part and in the
judgment); supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
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satisfied the requirements of the more stringent standard advo-
cated by Justice O'Connor 150
Yet the court did not discuss Asahi with regard to the stream
of commerce issue. Instead, the court immediately undertook to
distinguish this case from Asahi, stating that while the defen-
dant, as a foreign business, would suffer "unique burdens" 15'
in defending in Illinois,'52 the interests of the forum and the
plaintiff here, unlike those of the forum and the plaintiff in
Asahi, were significant.'5 3 The claim before it was not a collateral
action between foreign corporations but a claim involving an
injury to an Illinois resident in Illinois.
After noting these distinctions, the court concluded that
Illinois' assertion of jurisdiction was constitutional because the
defendant had delivered its product into the stream of commerce
with the expectation of its purchase in the forum. The court
cited as support for its conclusion Woodson and Gray '54 The
court also stated, without elaboration, that the defendant had
purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the forum through
the activities of its employee and the Maryland corporation. 55
Yet that statement, like the court's application of a stream of
commerce analysis, was supported by a citation to Woodson
rather than Asahi; 56 in fact, the court's only reference to the
justices' stream of commerce discussion in Asahi was a note that
four justices had cited Gray with approval.'
5 7
In a third case, Morris v SSE, Inc. ,' the Eleventh Circuit
applied the O'Connor standard, "the narrowest of the three
Asaht views," for "the limited purpose" of resolving the case
before it.'5 9 Morris involved a parachuting accident in Alabama
that resulted in the death of a Mississippi resident. The dece-
,"0 See id. at 1033; supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
' Mason, 832 F.2d at 386 (quoting Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1034).
Id. at 385-86.
"' Id. at 386.
154 Id.
" The court emphasized that the Maryland corporation was not an independent
distributor but rather the export manager for F Lli Luigi. Id. at 385, 386.
'6 Id. (citing Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297-98).
"I Id. at 386 n.4.
1 843 F.2d 489 (11th Cir. 1988).
,"9 Id. at 493 n.5.
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dent's estate brought a wrongful death action, alleging that death
had been caused by an automatic activation device manufactured
by SSE, Inc. ("SSE"), a Pennsylvania company with headquar-
ters in New Jersey SSE challenged the court's jurisdiction,
claiming that it lacked the necessary contacts with Alabama.
16
The court's use of the stream of commerce theory to support
its dismissal of SSE's challenge was, in some respects, puzzling.
The court acknowledged and specifically relied upon a direct
contact between the defendant and forum out of which the cause
of action allegedly arose. The defendant had, at the request of
an Alabama parachuting corporation, inspected and repaired the
actual injury-causing device, and then returned it directly to the
Alabama business. Moreover, the plaintiff alleged that the ac-
cident was caused, in part, by the defendant's negligent repair
of that device.
1 61
Yet the court chose not to rely solely on this direct contact
but looked as well to the defendant's indirect forum contacts.'
62
The scope of those indirect contacts, however, was unclear.
Record evidence indicated that SSE sold its products exclusively
through distributors in California, Illinois, and New York, and
dealers in unspecified states. 63 There was apparently no evidence
of sales to dealers in Alabama nor even of the regular use of
defendant's products in the state. '6 Also unknown was the man-
ner in which the particular injury-causing device reached Ala-
bama from Michigan, where it had been sold.1
65
Despite this absence of record evidence, the court concluded
that jurisdiction was permissible under the stream of commerce
theory proposed by Justice O'Connor 166 In the court's opinion,
1I Id. at 490. Plaintiff had originally brought suit in federal district court in
Mississippi. Following defendant's motion to dismiss, the case was transferred to the
Southern District of Alabama.
6I Id. at 491.
162 Id. at 493-94.
163 Id. at 491.
164 After the events relevant to this lawsuit occurred, defendant entered into a
dealership agreement with an Alabama business (although with regard to a different
product). During the two and one-half year period of the agreement's existence defendant
transacted sales in the amount of $450 with the Alabama company. Id.
165 Id.
'6 Id. at 493-94; see also Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033; supra notes 31-36 and
accompanying text.
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SSE not only placed its products in a nationwide stream of
commerce, but it sought to serve an Alabama market. This intent
was manifested, according to the court, in SSE's repair of the
allegedly injury-causing device, defendant's advertisement of its
products in Alabama, and the hazardous nature of those prod-
ucts. 67 The court concluded that SSE's repair of the product
and its return of the product to the Alabama store were equiv-
alent to SSE's desigmng the product for the forum state rather
than the result of a unilateral act by the Alabama business.
168
After all, SSE chose to repair the device sent to it by the
Alabama corporation and to return the device to Alabama.
169
The court further held that SSE's advertisements in national
trade journals could constitute advertising in the forum since it
could reasonably be inferred that such magazines had appeared
in Alabama, and SSE had not argued to the contrary 170
Finally, and most interesting, the court cited Justice Stevens'
hazardous nature factor as further support for its conclusion.
171
The court reasoned that parachuting was a dangerous activity,
that the defendant's product was a component of the decedent's
parachuting system and, thus, SSE's device was a "hazardous
product.' ' 72 Since SSE was aware that the Alabama store to
which it returned the device was a parachute jumping operation,
SSE knew that it was sending a hazardous product into Ala-
bama. Although the court conceded that Stevens' "volume" and
"value" factors did not support jurisdiction-only one transac-
tion involving the state had occurred and the value of the repairs
totaled only $123.21-the court concluded that its determination
was, nonetheless, valid since Stevens' standard did not require
the presence of all three factors. 73
167 Morris, 843 F.2d at 493-94.
I" Id. at 494.
19 Id. at 495.
110 Id. at 494.
7 Id. (citing Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)).
'7 Id.
"I Id. at 494 n.10. The significance of this "hazardous nature" element is also
apparent in a case in which a Rhode Island court applied the stream of commerce theory
to sustain its jurisdiction over generators of hazardous waste whose "products" caused
environmental harm in Rhode Island. In Violet v. Picillo, 613 F Supp. 1563 (D.R.I.
1988-89]
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Yet, beyond the resulting confusion and unanswered ques-
tions, the justices' opinions may exercise a more subtle influence
over lower-court applications of the stream of commerce theory
The O'Connor plurality indicates, for the first time, serious
doubt that foreseeability of the product's presence in the forum
is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction; instead, the defendant's
affiliation with the forum must arise from defendant's intent to
market its products there. 74 Moreover, though the Brennan and
Stevens opinions reject an intent requirement, they urge a stream
of commerce approach that emphasizes "regular" and "antici-
pated" sales' 75 to the forum as the basis for jurisdiction rather
than the single tort theory upon which some earlier stream of
commerce cases relied. 176 In light of these opinions, the courts
may choose independently to limit their jurisdictional reach un-
der the stream of commerce theory, requiring that the defen-
1985), defendant corporations and institutions had contracted with other compames,
operating in more than one state, for the disposal of certain waste products. The
defendants had no knowledge or expectations with regard to where the wastes would be
taken, merely paying for their disposal. The district court, companng these corporations
to manufacturers in the typical stream of commerce scenario, concluded that these
companies had chosen to transfer the burden of transporting and locating their waste
to a third party operating interstate and that they had benefited from that transfer of
responsibility. If defendants had wanted to avoid amenability to jurisdiction in Rhode
Island, they could have handled the waste themselves or, through contract, selected or
participated in the selection of the disposal site. Id. at 1577-78. Moreover, the court
emphasized that the products placed into this nationwide stream of commerce were
"volatile and dangerous substances." Where such products were involved, the court
concluded, a lesser showing of contacts would sustain jurisdiction. Id. at 1577.
Objections to the court's jurisdiction were renewed by one of the defendants after
trial. The court reconsidered these objections in O'Neil, 682 F Supp. 706, but, after
reviewing Asahi and relevant First Circuit precedent, reiterated the conclusions it had
reached m Violet. Although the court interpreted Asaht as "renouncing" the stream of
commerce doctrine, id. at 716-17, it held that junsdiction was constitutional in light of
Rhode Island's "compelling" interest in the lawsuit. Id. at 717-18. Citing Justice Stevens,
the court again emphasized the fact that the products at issue here were "inherently
dangerous" toxic substances rather than ordinary products. Moreover, the court found
that the significance of these forum contacts was enhanced by the fact that the nonres-
ident generators operated in a nationally regulated industry. Id. at 718.
17, See Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033.
171 See id. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurnng in part and in the judgment); id. at
1038 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (whether placing
product into stream of commerce constitutes purposeful availment depends on volume,
value and hazardous character of product).
176 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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dant's connection with the forum be established by evidence of
a substantial volume of sales to the forum and by evidence of
the defendant's intent to market its goods there.
Whether or not this result will come to pass must await the
development of a more substantial body of stream of commerce
opinions. Some courts have already recognized the potential for
the elimination of the stream of commerce theory originating in
Gray177 or at least the Court's imposition of some limitation on
the theory,1 78 and one court has explicitly noted the apparent
restriction of the theory to "regular and extensive sales. ' 179 Yet
the impact of that recognition, if any, remains unclear The few
cases in which these limitations might have suggested caution
have not typically resulted in the court's staying its jurisdictional
reach.1
0
177 See Hall, 669 F Supp. at 755; O'Neil, 682 F Supp. at 717
17S See, e.g., Ward v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 677 F Supp. 1092 (D. Colo.
1988).
" See id. at 1095. ("Four justices adopted the more liberal stream of commerce
theory, but noted in their concurring opimon '[t]he stream of commerce refers not to
unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products
from manufacture to distribution to retail sale."') (quoting Asaht, 107 S. Ct. at 1035
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the judgment)).
110 See, e.g., Morris, 843 F.2d 489. A few courts have exercised greater caution in
cases in which some features of the typical stream of commerce scenario are lacking.
See, e.g., Andrews Univ., 685 F Supp. 1015 (in which district court found that Canadian
manufacturer of boiler was not subject to jurisdiction in Michigan when defective boiler
had been sold to Canadian company and resold by it to Michigan purchaser; court
concluded that defendant lacked mimmum contacts with the forum, apparently because
there was no evidence that the second Canadian company had acted as defendant's agent
or distributor); Wiles v. Morita Iron Works Co., - N.E.2d - (Ill. 1988) (in which
court held that Japanese manufacturer was not subject to jurisdiction in Illinois where
allegedly defective machine had been sold, in Japan, to plaintiff's employer and trans-
ported by the employer to Illinois; court emphasized the "unilateral" nature of the
employer's act and the "isolated" nature of the transaction: defendant had no knowledge
that the employer, a New Jersey corporation, would take the machine to its Illinois
plant and defendant, primarily a manufacturer of machines used to make springs for
automobiles, had manufactured and sold only mine such machines, four of them to
plaintiff's employer).
Interestingly, an Ohio district court, in Sturgill v. Chema Nord Delekkemi Nobel
Indus., 687 F Supp. 351 (S.D. Ohio 1988), recently refused to exercise jurisdiction over
a Swedish chemical manufacturer whose allegedly defective product had injured an Ohio
resident. Although defendant regularly sold its products to American companies in
several states, it made no sales, directly or indirectly, to Ohio purchasers. The court
rejected plaintiff's stream of commerce claim that jurisdiction was warranted on the
ground that it was foreseeable that defendant's product would eventually be used in
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B. Long-Term Implications
More significantly, Asahi should prompt a long-overdue as-
sessment of the proper scope and role of the stream of commerce
concept in personal jurisdiction. Since a determination of that
role necessarily depends on the jurisdictional values that the
theory is intended to implement, such an assessment should begin
with the identification and clarification of the constitutional
limits on a state's authority to assert jurisdiction. In that regard,
this section will consider, and reject, the convement forum con-
cept that influenced Gray and certain of its followers. 181 As this
section will establish, jurisdiction analysis must, instead, recog-
nize the existence of sovereignty limits and the consistency of
the Court's "purposeful" connection requirement with those
limitations. Finally, this section will discuss the failure of the
justices' stream of commerce positions to accommodate this
analysis, and propose a revised approach to stream of commerce
analysis that properly reflects these sovereignty limts.
1. Sovereignty Limitations and the Fallacies of a Convenience
Theory
The nature and sources of the constitutional limitations on
a state's authority to assert jurisdiction have been vigorously
debated for years. Some commentators assert that the due proc-
ess clause is the sole constitutional limitation on personal juris-
diction and that the clause protects only the defendant's interest
Ohio: "[T]he issue is not whether defendant Eka Nobel should have foreseen that its
product would end up in Ohio, because the product may end up anywhere in the world,
but rather whether defendant Eka Nobel has had sufficient contact with Ohio that it
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Ohio." Id. at 354; cf. Bean
Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Technulogy Corp., 744 F.2d 1081, 1082-83 (5th Cir. 1984);
Giotis v. Apollo of the Ozarks, Inc., 800 F.2d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1092 (1987).
II See Wilmack, Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 635 P.2d 296, 297 (Nev.
1981) (indicating, with citation to Metal-Matic, the existence "at one time" of "a strong
jurisprudential trend emphasizing convemence of forum over all other jurisdictional
considerations"); Perschbacher, Minimum Contacts Reapplied: Mr. Justice Brennan Has
It His Way in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 1986 AiZ. ST. L.J. 585, 594 (noting
commentators' predictions, after McGee, that jurisdiction and venue principles would
coalesce).
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in a."fair" forum. 182 For some of those commentators "fair-
ness" is assessed in convemence terms. That is, jurisdictional
analysis is properly concerned only with whether litigation in the
forum is unduly burdensome and that determination is made on
the basis of the actual litigation burden borne by the defendant
or some balancing of the relative convemences of the parties
and, possibly, the forum.""
The Supreme Court has often described the due process
clause as protecting the defendant from "inconvement" litiga-
tion.' And the Court has explicitly acknowledged that the plain-
tiff's and the forum's interests, as well as the burden on the
defendant, play some role, although secondary, in the jurisdic-
tional calculus.' 8 5 Yet the Court has never regarded convenience
In See Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstrac-
tion in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NoamE DAME L. REv 699, 727-
28, 732-33 (1983); Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A The-
oretical Evaluation, 75 Nw U.L. Rav. 1112 (1981); see also Weintraub, supra note 118,
at 522-27; cf. Whutten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A
Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
Clauses (Part Two), 14 CREIG rON L. REv 735, 836, 846 (1981) (concluding that the
due process clause protects defendant's right to an effective hearing).
"I See Redish, supra note 182, at 1138-42 (stating that the forum's assertion of
jurisdiction is unconstitutional only if the court finds first, that defendant would suffer
"meaningful inconvemence" if forced to defend in the forum and second, that a
consideration of the parties' relative burdens and the state's interest in the controversy
do not indicate that the forum should be allowed to assert jurisdiction despite that
inconvenience); see also Whitten, supra note 182, at 846. Professor Whitten concludes
that the forum may always exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless that
defendant can show that defending in the forum would be so burdensome, relative to
the burden of defending at home or in a more convenient forum, that defendant would
be effectively deprived of an opportunity to defend the lawsuit.
Other commentators have similarly advocated a venue-type analysis for personal
jurisdiction. See Hazard, Interstate Venue, 74 Nw. U.L. Rav 711 (1979); Ehrenzweig,
From State Jurisdiction to Interstate Venue, 50 OR. L. REv 103 (1971).
I" See, e.g., Woodson, 444 U.S. at 291-92 (minimum contacts standard acts, in
part, to protect defendant from litigation in an inconvenient forum); see also McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957) (noting that the inconvenience
defendant would suffer from defending in the forum would not constitute denial of due
process); International Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (stating that
inconvemence to defendant caused by litigation away from home is relevant to deter-
mination that forum's assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with due process).
"I Prior to 1980, the relevance of these factors to jurisdiction analysis was unclear.
Compare McGee, 355 U.S. at 223-24 (emphasizing California's interest in the litigation
and significance of burden on plaintiff if forced to litigate in a distant forum) with
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (interests of forum and plaintiff to be
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or venue considerations as the primary measure of a state's right
to assert jurisdiction. Instead, the Court has traditionally as-
sessed the "fairness" of the forum's jurisdiction on the basis of
a constitutionally adequate connection between the defendant
and the forum, as tested by the minmum contacts standard. 18 6
Moreover, the Court has explicitly, albeit unevenly, indicated
that its minmum contacts standard is more than a reflection of
its opinion of the proper measure of the defendant's litigation
burden. According to the Court, the limitations on a state's
authority to exercise jurisdiction include a structural or territorial
element that demands constitutionally adequate "ties" between
"considered," but "essential" criterion is defendant's activity); and Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977) (stating that strong state interest is insufficient to sustain forum
jurisdiction; '.[t]he issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law') (quoting Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958)).
In Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292-93, the Court formally acknowledged the relevance
of these interests, as well as "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the
most efficient resolution of controversies" and "the shared interest of the several States
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies," to the jurisdiction determination.
But their role was apparently limited to "appropriate cases" and the Court did not
identify those cases or what role the factors would play there. Since Woodson the Court
has confirmed that the factors have a role to play in jurisdiction analysis, but the
significance and nature of that role have not been fully determined. See Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (indicating that these considerations may
serve to establish jurisdiction on a lesser showing of minimum contacts than might
otherwise be required and, conversely, that defendant may present a "compelling" case
that jurisdiction would be unreasonable on the basis of these factors, although the
minimum contacts standard is satisfied); Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033-35 (junsdiction held
unconstitutional on the basis of an assessment of these factors, although at least four
justices believed that the defendant had sufficient mimmum contacts with the forum to
justify its assertion of jurisdiction and no discussion of whether defendant presented a
compelling case); see also Stebbins, Asahi and Reasonableness: Constitutionalization of
the Forum Non Convemens Doctrine? 51 (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with
author) (noting that Asahi did not mention Burger King's presumption of reasonableness
with potential for rebuttal by "compelling" case and that, in fact, Court appeared to
impose burden of establishing the reasonableness of jurisdiction on Cheng Shin).
"I See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474; Kulko, 436 U.S. at 91-92; Hanson, 357 U.S.
at 251, 254; see also Lewis, supra note 182, at 708 (noting that International Shoe
standard does not directly measure the fairness of the forum according to its convenience
for the defendant but looks instead to forum-defendant contacts); Stein, Styles of
Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEx. L.
REv 689, 704-05, 708 n.90 (1987) (stating that convenience considerations have never
divested a court of jurisdiction when other justifications supported jurisdiction nor
conferred jurisdiction in the absence of those other justifications, and noting that the
Court's jurisdictional standard does not assess the actual litigation burdens defendant
would bear if forced to defend in the forum).
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the defendant and the forum.1 7 In Hanson, for example, the
Court stated that due process requires satisfaction of the mini-
mum contacts standard, though the defendant's burden of de-
fending in the forum be nonexistent, because the restrictions
imposed by the due process clause are "a consequence of terri-
torial limitations on the power of the respective States,"' 88 as
well as a protection against inconvenient litigation. And in
Woodson, the Court stated both that the mimmum contacts
requirement encompassed a concern for the defendant's protec-
tion against inconvenient litigation and an interest in preventing
a state's overreacing the limits imposed by its status as a
member of the federal system" 9 and, significantly, that the fo-
rum might be constitutionally inadequate despite its desirability
from a convenience standpoint.' 90 In short, the Court has not
only failed to view personal jurisdiction in convenience terms, it
has also identified limitations that would preclude the adoption
of a convemence-based jurisdictional analysis.
Yet the Court's recognition of this territorial or structural
component has been neither consistent nor clear. Nor has the
Court clearly identified the source of these limitations or their
significance for personal jurisdiction analysis. The Court in Han-
son did .not elaborate upon its statement, and the role of terri-
torial limitations, other than as support for a minimum contacts
theory, was not articulated. Moreover, the importance of that
statement was apparently nummized in the Court's subsequent
opinion in Shaffer v Heitner,191 where Justice Marshall observed
that the Hanson statement "simply makes the point that the
States are defined by their geographical territory ,192
I" International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (The due process clause "does not contem-
plate that a state may make binding a judgment m personam against an individual or
corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.").
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251.
Woodson, 444 U.S. at 291-92.
110 Id. at 294; see also Wilmack, 635 P.2d at 297 (in which the court stated that
despite one-time judicial emphasis on forum convenience as primary consideration in
jurisdiction analysis, Supreme Court made clear in Woodson that "jurisdiction based
upon forum convemence alone is improper under the due process clause" (citing Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286)).
-,' 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
192 Id. at 204 n.20; see Lewis, supra note 182, at 710-11 (describing Shaffer's
treatment of sovereignty concept in Hanson as "a vacuous sweet nothing").
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In Woodson the Court made some attempt to remedy these
deficiencies. It stated that the sovereignty of each state imposes
a limitation on the sovereignty of other states and that that
limitation was "express or implicit in both the original scheme
of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. 11 93 In ad-
dition, the Court emphasized the significance of that limitation,
asserting that "the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument
of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State
of its power to render a valid judgment"-although that forum
offered the most convenient location, defendant suffered little
or no inconvenience in defending there, and the state had a
substantial interest in the litigation.194 Again, however, the Court
failed to specify the manner in which these limitations would
operate within a personal jurisdiction analysis. 95
Woodson's articulation of federalism concerns as a factor in
jurisdiction analysis provoked a rash of scholarly criticism.1 96
Commentators argued that the due process clause is the only
source of limitations on the state's assertion of jurisdiction and
that the clause protects "persons" rather than states. 97 This
extension of due process protection to states' interests is, critics
asserted, unsupported by the text of the Constitution, by history,
or on policy grounds. 19 Moreover, such extension is unnecessary;
where federalism concerns are entitled to protection, they are
explicitly and properly entrusted to other portions of the Con-
193 Woodson, 444 U.S. at 293.
11 Id. at 294 (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254).
191 The Court decided Woodson on the basis of the minimum contacts test and did
not indicate how its application of that test accommodated the previously identified
interstate federalism interests. See Braveman, Interstate Federalism and Personal Juris-
diction, 33 SYRACUSE L. RPEv 533, 534 (1984) ("The Court's opinion speaks only in
empty slogans about sovereignty and is silent on the contours of the new doctrine.");
see also Ripple & Murphy, supra note 52, at 75 ("Having emphasized the role of
interstate federalism, the Court gives only the vaguest idea of what this emphasis will
mean in concrete application."). But see Jay, supra note 118, at 441 (arguing that
mimmum contacts analysis is "directed entirely toward the 'sovereignty' limitation").
"9 See Braveman, supra note 195; Lewis, supra note 182; Redish, supra note 182;
Weintraub, supra note 118.
" See Lewis, supra note 182, at 700-01, 735; Redish, supra note 182, at 1120,
1129-33; see also Braveman, supra note 195, at 541-43.
I" Redish, supra note 182, at 1120-29.
[VOL. 77
REAPPRAISAL OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
stitution. 19 Finally, commentators argued that Woodson's anal-
ysis posed substantial problems for future use of the widely
accepted concepts of consent and waiver. If sovereignty interests
are implicated in the jurisdiction analysis, individuals cannot
consent to a forum's assertion of junsdiction because an indi-
vidual has no power to waive sovereign rights.2°°
A mere two years after Woodson was decided, the Court
appeared to retreat from its statements in Woodson. In Insur-
ance Corp. of Ireland v Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee°20
("CBG") the Court explained those statements, describing the
restriction on a state's power, not as a product of interstate
federalism concerns, but as "ultimately a function of the indi-
vidual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause." 20 2
That clause, the Court observed, "is the only source of the
personal jurisdiction requirement[,J and the Clause itself makes
no mention of federalism concerns. ' 203 Moreover, the Court
acknowledged the fundamental inconsistency of its federalism
concept with traditional notions of waiver, concluding that if
federalism interests could independently restrict a state's author-
ity to exercise jurisdiction, the personal jurisdiction requirement
could not be waived.20
4
Commentators interpreted CBG as repudiating Woodson's
federalism theme and rejoiced 25 but generally did not explore
any further implications of the Court's statements. Nor has the
I" See Redish, supra note 182, at 1123 ("The primary constitutional provision
dealing with problems of interstate friction is the full faith and credit clause ");
accord Stebbms, supra note 185, at 115; cf. Lewis, supra note 182, at 736 ("[R]espect
for the sovereign rights of the states should be enforced through the development of
meaningful restrictions on choice of law under the full faith and credit clause.").
mo See Braveman, supra note 195, at 554; Lewis, supra note 182, at 726; see also
Weintraub, supra note 118, at 504.
:0 456 U.S. 694 (1982) [hereinafter CBG].
Id. at 703 n.10.
20 Id.
2W Id.
20, See Lewis, supra note 182, at 726-27, 739-42; Perschbacher, supra note 181, at
617; Weintraub, supra note 118, at 486; cf. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal
Jurisdiction, 68 IowA L. Rnv 1015 (1983) (arguing that federalism theme remains in
personal jurisdiction analysis after CBG, but concluding that theme is preserved only as
a by-product of the protection afforded the individual defendant).
1988-891
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Court, in subsequent cases, elaborated upon these statements. 206
While reiterating CBG's characterization of restrictions on state
power as a function of the individual's liberty interest, 2 7 the
Court has offered no further explanation of the impact of those
restrictions for personal jurisdiction theory 208 As a result, the
Court has left unresolved whether its apparent2°9 rejection of
Woodson's federalism theme is a rejection as well of a territorial
or structural restriction on a state's right to assert jurisdiction.
As others have recogmzed, the conclusion that federalism
concerns are irrelevant to personal jurisdiction analysis does not
compel a similar conclusion with regard to territorial restrictions.
The existence of sovereignty limitations on a state's authority to
assert jurisdiction is readily supported whether on the basis of
structural considerations or the due process clause itself.210 In
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985); Burger King,
471 U.S. at 472 n.13 (1985); see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
776 (1984).
CBG, 456 U.S. at 702-03.
In CBG, Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment, expressed concern that the
Court's apparent abandonment of sovereignty limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction
would dictate a similar abandonment of the rmnmum contacts standard. According to
Justice Powell, the majority's rejection of minimum contacts as a sovereignty limitation
meant that personal jurisdiction for the first time would be defined solely by "abstract
notions of fair play," id. at 714 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment), thereby
effecting a substantial change in the law. The majority denied this conclusion and,
indeed, since CBG the rmmum contacts standard has remained the "touchstone" of
personal jurisdiction analysis. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. Yet the Court has said
nothing further about what impact its recasting of the nature of defendant's interest
may have on that analysis.
2 The demise of the federalism theme is no longer as certain as it once appeared.
See Lewis, supra note 182, at 739-42. The Court has continued to cite the forum state
interest and the interstate systems' interests in furthering shared substantive policies and
the efficient resolution of the controversy as factors relevant to the jurisdiction analysis.
Moreover, Asahi has made clear that these factors may play a significant role in that
analysis, at least in certain situations. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1034-35; see Bearry, 818 F.2d
at 377; cf. Maltz, Unraveling the Conundrum of the Law of Personal Jurisdiction: A
Comment on Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 1987 DuKn
L.J. 669, 688-90 (arguing that Asahi "implicitly confirms the demise" of Woodson's
federalism analysis since, if such concerns were important in jurisdiction analysis, aliens
would presumably receive less protection, a presumption inconsistent with Asahi's anal-
ysis). The identification of those situations and the extent to which those factors will
prove influential, however, remain to be determined.
2,1 See Bearry, 818 F.2d at 373-74; Brilmayer, supra note 118, at 85; Drobak, supra
note 205; Stein, supra note 186, at 705-14; Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal
Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 377 (1985).
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our system, states are sovereigns with certain attributes of sov-
ereignty, including the right to try cases in their courts. That
sovereignty, however, is limited. States are, and historically have
been, sovereign with respect to a particular territory (and the
people, property, and events therein), and their right to assert
sovereign prerogatives is necessarily limited by that fact and by
the existence of other, co-equal sovereigns. Moreover, a state's
assertion of jurisdiction is an exercise of its sovereign power.
After all, that state claims the right to compel the defendant to
litigate a particular action in its courts or suffer the consequences
of default. As an assertion of sovereign power, then, a state's
exercise of jurisdiction is, like other assertions of sovereignty,
limited.2 1
Moreover, recognizing the existence of sovereignty limita-
tions is not inevitably inconsistent with the view that the due
process clause protects the liberty interests of individuals rather
than states. While a state's illegitimate assertion of power may
or may not intrude on another state's sovereignty, it clearly
infringes the due process interests of the individual. As some
have suggested, the "fairness" assured the defendant by the due
process clause presupposes adjudication of the defendant's sub-
stantive rights by a legitimate sovereign. 212 When a state asserts
jurisdiction over a nonresident in excess of its sovereign power
it acts without authority and, thus, in violation of defendant's
due process interests.
21 3
Similarly, recognition of these territorial or structural limi-
tations on state sovereignty does not endanger accepted notions
of consent and waiver in the personal jurisdiction context. Under
the theory outlined above, the protection afforded by these
limitations runs to the individual, and the interest protected is
his right to be free from an unrelated sovereign. 2 4 Moreover, a
2" See Weisburd, supra note 210, at 383-402; see also Stein, supra note 186, at
706, 743-46.
212 See Currie, supra note 64, at 534 (noting that personal jurisdiction limitations
protect defendant against the unfairness of being compelled to defend himself in a state
with which he has no relevant connections); Drobak, supra note 205, at 1046-47; Stein,
supra note 186, at 706, 711; Weisburd, supra note 210, at 411.
213 See Stein, supra note 186, at 707, 711; Weisburd, supra note 210, at 411.
'4 See Stein, supra note 186, at 712-13 (noting that CBG held that "the right to
resist unauthorized jurisdiction ultimately rested with the individual and not with other
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conclusion that sovereignty limitations necessarily preclude the
operation of waiver and consent theories wrongly assumes that
such limitations implicate the same interests, with the same
consequences, whatever the context. The power to compel the
defendant to answer in the forum is not, however, the forum's
power to adjudicate the lawsuit. 215 As Professor Weisburd points
out, in violating subject matter jurisdiction rules, the court seeks
to control categories of activities beyond its competence. Such
violations, which ignore the limitations society has placed on the
court's authority, constitute attacks on the foundations of gov-
ernment and inflict systemic harm. Waiver of these violations
would not only countenance the flouting of the rules society has
established for the court's existence but would also require so-
cietal consent since it is society's interests that are implicated.
21 6
In contrast, a court that violates personal jurisdiction res-
trictions causes harm at a less fundamental level. The court seeks
only to control persons beyond the scope of its power, and the
resulting harm inures to them alone. Because violations of per-
sonal jurisdiction rules threaten this narrower group of interests,
the dangers they pose to basic governmental limitations are far
less substantial. Accordingly, they may be waived by the iden-
tifiable individuals whose rights are implicated.
21 7
2. Sovereignty Limitations and the Purposeful Availment
Standard: A Reconciliation
The immediate consequence of recognizing sovereignty limi-
tations on the exercise of personal jurisdiction is the rejection
states" and stating: "The concern of the due process analysis is not that states are
offended when others improperly assert jurisdiction over their residents. Whether or not
the states care about these offenses, individuals may care when a state acting outside of
its legitimate sphere of authority seeks to adjudicate their rights."); see also Drobak,
supra note 205, at 1047
2I See Bearry, 818 F.2d at 373, in which Judge Higginbotham observed:
The restnction on state sovereign power limits the power of a state to
compel a citizen of a sister state to submit to its process. This restriction
does not affect the subject matter jurisdiction of the state's courts-the
power to adjudicate the matter once consent is given. Accordingly, non-
residents may consent to litigation in a foreign state without raising fed-
eralism concerns To hold otherwise either confuses the distinction
between the power to compel and the power to adjudicate or disregards
our federalist structure.
216 Weisburd, supra note 210, at 414-15.
217 Id.
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of a convenience-based analysis. If sovereignty limitations exist,
a state's assertion of personal jurisdiction cannot be justified
merely by the absence of a "meaningful" litigation burden or
upon some weighing of the relative inconveniences to the parties;
instead, that assertion must acknowledge, and reflect, the limited
scope of the state's sovereign power. Yet the conclusion that
state lines are more than a convenient measure of litigational
burdens more clearly indicates what jurisdiction is not than what
it is; there remains the task of defining the linuts those lines
establish for personal jurisdiction analysis.
Because a state's sovereign power extends to persons, prop-
erty, and events within its boundaries, it has been argued that
the state's right to exercise jurisdiction should be related to its
internal regulatory authority 218 The nature of that relationship
has been variously described, although typically in functional
terms. Thus, jurisdiction is viewed as a means to a regulatory
end 19 or as enabling the state to apply its substantive law to the
underlying dispute. 20 The forum's assertion of jurisdiction then
becomes appropriate when it promotes the forum's regulatory
interest 22' or when the forum is warranted in applying its sub-
stantive law m In any event, the proper focus of the jurisdic-
tional inquiry, according to this view, is the forum's regulatory
interest in the dispute.
218 See id. at 402-05 (arguing that "a state's authority is limited to controlling
transactions, things and people connected with its territory" and that a state's right to
assert jurisdiction, like other assertions of state sovereignty, is similarly limited); see also
Stein, supra note 186, at 738-45 (concluding that state may not assert jurisdiction when
that assertion is unconnected to state's interest in regulating forum events); Brilmayer,
supra note 118, at 86, 88 (stating that forum's assertion of junsdiction may be justified
on the basis of state's nght to regulate forum activities).
219 See Brilmayer, supra note 118, at 85-88; see also Stein, supra note 186, at 750-
52.
See Stebbins, supra note 185, at 122, 124-25.
22 See Stein, supra note 186, at 750-52.
2 See Stebbins, supra note 185, at 124-25. Of course, as Professor Stebbins has
recognized, these conclusions to some extent merely shift the ground of inquiry. Answers
must still be supplied with respect to the circumstances in which the forum legitimately
applies its law, id. at 126, or, alternatively, when the exercise of jurisdiction "promotes"
a state's legitimate regulatory interest. Stein, supra note 186, at 738-60.
Professor Stein has similarly concluded that jurisdiction is appropriate when the
state may legitimately apply its own law to the underlying dispute. Stein, supra note
186, at 752-53.
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The Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction analysis has not
traditionally centered on the existence of some regulatory con-
nection as the basis of a state's right to assert jurisdiction.
Indeed, the Court has been at some pains to distinguish the
personal jurisdiction inquiry from choice of law analysis, to
which the Court points as the proper province of the forum's
regulatory concerns. 22 Instead, jurisdiction theory has focused
on the presence or absence of a voluntary, beneficial relationship
between the defendant and forum. That is, not only must the
defendant have nummum contacts with the forum, but those
contacts must reflect the defendant's "purposeful availment" of
the benefits and protections of the forum.224
The Court has never fully explained the nature of this pur-
poseful availment requirement, instead issuing somewhat cryptic
pronouncements to describe what the standard demands. Thus,
the relevant contacts must be those of the defendant, rather than
the "unilateral" acts of another.22 Moreover, the acts must be
22 See, e.g., Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98:
But while the presence of the children and one parent in California arguably
might favor application of California law in a lawsuit in New York, the
fact that California may be "'the center of gravity'" for choice-of-law
purposes does not mean that California has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.
(quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254); see also Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 215. But see Welkowitz,
Beyond Burger King: The Federal Interest in Personal Jurisdiction, 56 FORDRAM L. REv.
1, 32 & n.188 (1987) (suggesting that Burger King and Asaht offer some evidence of the
Court's movement toward consideration of choice of law interests in personal jurisdiction
analysis).
In addition, while the Court has formally acknowledged some role for forum
interest in the jurisdictional calculus, that role has generally been a secondary one. See
supra note 185; see also Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92 (noting that the interests of the forum
and the plaintiff are to be considered in determimng the forum's right to exercise
jurisdiction, but that the "essential" criterion to that determination is the quality and
nature of the defendant's activity); Lewis, The "Forum State Interest"Factor in Personal
Jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33 MERCER
L. REv 769, 770-71 (1982) (concluding that forum state interest has never, in itself,
"tipped the scales in favor of jurisdiction. Nor has its absence impelled the Court
to deny" otherwise justifiable assertions of jurisdiction.); cf. Stein, supra note 186, at
733-34 (noting Court's disavowal of forum interest as proper element of jurisdiction
analysis and contemporaneous reluctance to divorce analysis from state's power to assert
its authority).
22 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253);
Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297; Stein, supra note 186, at 717-33.
2 See Woodson, 444 U.S. at 298; Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980);
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253-54.
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"purposeful;" the defendant's receipt of forum benefits, without
more, cannot supply the requisite connection between the defen-
dant and the forum.
n6
The Court's adoption of a purposeful availment standard is,
at least as an historical matter, unsurprising. Prior to Interna-
tional Shoe, the courts had applied theories of consent, presence,
and doing business in order to assert jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents within the analytical framework of Pennoyer 227 Conse-
quently, the concept of a voluntary affiliation with the forum
and the idea that defendant be amenable to jurisdiction as a
quid pro quo for the benefits derived from activities there were
jurisdictional constructs with which the courts had substantial
experience.
Less clear, perhaps, is why the Court has continued to apply
a purposeful availment standard. It has been, after all, some
years since the International Shoe decision, and any transitional
stage has long since passed. If the historical perspective offers
the only justification for the standard, perhaps it is, as Justice
Brennan has suggested, an anachronism, an "outmoded" juris-
dictional model that has no relevance to current jurisdictional
realities.m
The Court has not, however, purported to base its purposeful
availment requirement on history alone. Rather, the Court has
elaborated, albeit sparingly, a constitutional justification for the
standard-identifymg notice and predictability interests to which
the standard affords protection. In Woodson, perhaps the Court's
most elaborate explanation of the purposeful availment require-
ment, the Court stated that the due process clause "gives a
degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some mini-
mum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render
2 See, e.g., Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 215-16; see also Woodson, 444 U.S. at 298-99.
227 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text; see also Kurland, supra note 53,
at 574-86 (discussing doctnnes of consent, presence and doing business and their appli-
cation by the courts).
I" Woodson, 444 U.S. at 307-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (argmng that extreme
defendant focus of minimum contacts standard no longer necessary or useful in light of
modern commercial, transportation and commumcation realities). See supra notes 113-
17 and accompanying text.
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them liable to suit.' '229 Consequently, the defendant's contacts
with the forum must be such that the defendant can foresee
being haled into court there. The purposeful availment standard
promotes that expectation because a defendant that has pur-
posefully availed itself of the opportunity to act in the forum
has clear notice, from those acts, of its amenability there to suit.
On the basis of this notice, the defendant can choose to avoid
amenability by withdrawing from the forum, or it can insure
against the cost of litigation there.
230
These statements have been quickly distmssed as "meaning-
less" or, at best, "circular " A defendant will expect to be haled
into court whenever and wherever the Court indicates its behav-
ior will subject it to jurisdiction. 231 The Court's statements do
not, therefore, indicate in what circumstances a defendant's
activities should render it amenable to jurisdiction m a particular
forum and thus, in themselves, fail to provide meaningful con-
tent to the purposeful availment standard.2 12 Moreover, and
significantly, in its explanation and justification of the purpose-
ful availment standard, the Court has nowhere defined the rel-
evance of its standard to a jurisdictional analysis reflecting
sovereignty limitations. If the focus of the jurisdictional inquiry
should be whether the state has any business regulating the
forum activity or effect, as some have urged, a standard based
on the defendant's voluntary, beneficial relationship with the
forum seems ill-suited to the task.
233
22 Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297
23 Id., see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472.
211 See Perschbacher, supra note 181, at 604; Redish, supra note 182, at 1134;
Stein, supra note 186, at 701; see also Jay, supra note 118, at 443.
22 See Stein, supra note 186, at 701-02 ("Predictability might be an important
element of 'fair play and substantial justice,' but in the absence of a more developed
theory of why individuals expect to be subject to jurisdiction, the formulation is incom-
plete and cannot be used to distinguish predictable from unpredictable assertions of
jurisdiction.").
23 See Stein, supra note 186, at 733-38 (arguing that the purposeful availment
standard improperly determines the legitimacy of forum's assertions of jurisdiction by
existence of consensual relationship rather than by the strength of the state's regulatory
claim); Weisburd, supra note 210, at 405-06 (arguing that purposeful availment require-
ment is inconsistent with territorial sovereignty model; state has authority to assert
jurisdiction whenever there occurs within the forum an event creating an occasion for
regulation by the state and requirement of intentional contacts is unconnected to the
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These apparently disparate notions of sovereignty limitations
and "purposeful availment" have been reconciled in a control-
based theory advanced by Professor Brilmayer Like other com-
mentators recogmzmg sovereignty limits on jurisdiction, Profes-
sor Brilmayer acknowledges that a state may justify its assertion
of jurisdiction on the basis of its right to regulate activities or
events within the forum.214 Yet there are limits to the assertions
of jurisdiction that justification will support.
Initially, she points out, the exercise of jurisdiction with
regard to a forum event is, in reality, an attempt to determine
the rights and liabilities of persons with respect to that event.
Consequently, the occurrence of a forum event or activity does
not itself permit the state to exercise jurisdiction over the defen-
dant.25 Instead, a state may require a nonresident to defend a
claim in these circumstances only if the defendant is somehow
"responsible" for the forum occurrence. 236
Responsibility is readily attributed, according to Professor
Brilmayer, when the event the state seeks to regulate is the
defendant's forum conduct (or that of its agent), or when the
defendant has intentionally caused a forum effect. A more dif-
ficult attribution issue is presented, however, when the forum
effect that the state seeks to regulate was unintended, as in
Woodson. The defendants there had not deliberately marketed
issue of regulability); cf. Stebbins, supra note 185, at 129-30 (asserting that Court's
current purposeful availment standard does not properly assess forum's right to assert
jurisdiction or apply its substantive law).
-' Professor Brilmayer asserts that while a state may readily require its citizens to
defend in its courts, imposition of jurisdiction costs on nonresidents must be justified.
Brilmayer, supra note 118, at 85-86. The state may invoke a regulatory justification if
its imposition of these costs is premised on the defendant's "related" contacts with the
forum. As she explains, related contacts are those forum occurrences that, when defined
in terms of substantive relevance, are "exactly those already defined as a proper subject
for regulation under the applicable substantive law." Id. at 86.
In contrast to this regulatory or territorial aspect of a state's sovereignty, a state
may seek to assert jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant's systematic, unrelated
contacts with the forum. This aspect of state sovereignty, "self-governance," is based
on the premse that this defendant-forum connection indicates that the individual or
corporate defendant is enough of an insider that, like other citizens of the state, he may
invoke the state's political processes if he objects to the burdens the state imposes. Id.
at 86-87.
"' Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 89.
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the injury-causing product in the forum; indeed, the product's
presence there was due solely to the decision (and action) of the
plaintiffs .237
Professor Brilmayer argues that a state's assertion of juris-
diction in these circumstances, that is, on the basis of an umin-
tended effect, is inconsistent with the sovereignty limitations on
personal jurisdiction. In the products liability context, for ex-
ample, a defendant that has some ability to control the location
of its products can withdraw from the forum if the costs of
operating there are greater than the benefits it receives from
those operations. That ability to withdraw, in turn, restrains the
forum from imposing unreasonable jurisdictional costs on the
defendant since, typically, the state will not want to discourage
the defendant from marketing its products in the state. If the
defendant has no control over the location of its products,
however, it cannot withdraw from the forum in the event its
activities there become too costly Hence, there is no effective
check on the forum's willingness to assert junsdictionY5
The presence of such a check is significant. The state has an
interest in providing a convement forum for its residents. In the
absence of any countervailing considerations, such as the risk
that the defendant will withdraw, the state will have every reason
to provide that forum. At the same time, in the absence of the
ability to withdraw, there are no assurances that the costs of
litigating in the forum do not exceed the benefits derived there-
from.39 Consequently, any excess costs are imposed on nonres-
ident consumers, persons outside the legitimate scope of the
state's sovereign power 240
"I Id. at 89-91.
M" Id. at 95-96.
219 Professor Brilmayer contends that there is no basis for infermng that any benefits
defendant derived from this forum activity were so substantial, even with the jurisdic-
tional costs, that defendant could be "presumed to have agreed to take his chances."
Id. at 96.
m, Id. at 95-96. Professor Brilmayer contrasts the inappropriateness of "strict
liability" jurisdiction with the forum's right to adopt and apply substantive strict liability.
She notes with regard to the latter that a state may choose to shift the loss from a
particular plaintiff to enterprises better able to bear the loss, and, thus, eventually to
all consumers of the products of those enterprises, without violating due process. Tins
reallocation of the loss from an individual to all consumers, however, is consistent with
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This control theory is attractive for a number of reasons.
First, and most significantly, it reconciles the purposeful avail-
ment standard with a jurisdictional analysis that reflects sover-
eignty limitations on a state's authority to exercise jurisdiction.
The defendant's purposeful conduct provides an effective check
on the state's incentive to overreach the boundaries of its sov-
ereign power, as well as serving the traditional liberty interests
of notice and predictability 241 Second, the theory provides some
the state's authority to govern its citizens. Moreover, because a state's decision to impose
strict liability affects the instate business activities of both residents and nonresidents,
the state has substantial incentive to consider carefully the consequences arising from
that decision. Id.
Professor Stebbins challenges this distinction between the cost allocation conse-
quences of substantive stnct liability and those of jurisdictional strict liability, arguing
that Professor Brilmayer's theory would allow extra-territonal cost spreading of sub-
stantive liability costs only when the defendant is a resident manufacturer or a nonres-
ident manufacturer subject to general jurisdiction. Stebbins, supra note 185, at 131
n.319.
I do not read Professor Brilmayer as precluding a -state's application of its sub-
stantive law over nonresidents in specific jurisdiction situations. What she suggests is
that a state may legitimately choose to spread the costs of substantive strict liability
pursuant to its authority to govern its citizens and regulate events and transactions within
its boundaries. To the extent there are extraterritorial consequences to this cost-shifting,
they are merely incidental to the state's exercise of its core authority. Moreover, because
a state's decision to adopt substantive strict liability will necessarily affect residents as
well as nonresidents, its ramifications will be carefully considered.
In the jurisdiction context, however, a state has no similar countervailing interests
that will restrain its assertions of jurisdiction over the nonresident. The state always has
an incentive to provide a convement forum for a resident plaintiff and to shift junsdic-
tional costs to nonresidents. Thus, absent defendant's ability to withdraw, there are no
restraints on a state's incentive to overreach and no guarantee that costs are not
necessarily shifted to consumers outside the scope of a state's legitimate power. Id.
-" Professor Weisburd also rejects this cost allocation argument. He contends that
losses will be shifted primarily to out-of-state consumers whenever the defendant does
only a little business in the forum. In this situation, he argues, the contacts of those
nonresident consumers with the forum are probably nonexistent whether defendant's
contacts are fortuitous or intentional. Consequently, under Professor Brilmayer's theory,
states would always be precluded from asserting jurisdiction over businesses that sell
most of their products outside the forum. Weisburd, supra note 210, at 406 n.l11.
This objection misses the point. A defendant that has some ability to control the
location of its product may, even if it does only a little business in the forum, assess
the costs and benefits of those activities and, possibly, pass along those costs to resident
consumers or, if the benefits prove insufficient, withdraw from the forum. These options
operate as a restraint on a state's willingness to exceed its sovereign reach. Absent that
restraint, a state has no incentive not to assert jurisdiction, and there is no guarantee
that the costs of the forum's assumption of jurisdiction are not necessarily passed on to
nonresident consumers.
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meaningful content to the Court's purposeful availment stan-
dard. As properly interpreted, that standard precludes jurisdic-
tion on the basis of unintended effects and, in the products
liability context, requires that a defendant have some control
over the location of its products. This control requirement offers
a more objective measure of the defendant's amenability to
jurisdiction than the foreseeability standard with which the courts
have struggled. Moreover, because that requirement enhances
the defendant's ability to assess and control the consequences of
its acts, it better serves the notice and predictability interests
typically recognized as within the scope of due process protec-
tion .
242
Yet, the brighter line that the control requirement appears
to offer can be illusory Although it is relatively clear that the
defendant controls the location of its products when it deliber-
ately sends the product into the forum, or intentionally exploits
the forum market, the control question becomes somewhat
murkier in other situations. In one typical stream of commerce
situation, for example, the manufacturer sells its products to
unrelated distributors that market the products according to their
desires and marketing objectives. The manufacturer may or may
not know, to a greater or lesser extent, of these objectives. 243 In
another situation (such as Woodson) the product reaches the
forum solely by virtue of the purchaser's act. To what extent
does the manufacturer or retailer in these situations "control"
or, conversely, lack control over the presence of its products in
the forum?
242 Cf. Stebbins, supra note 185, at 129-30 (suggesting that a foreseeability standard
is not inherently inconsistent with defendant's need to predict the risk of junsdiction in
the forum; rather, confusion created is the result of the Court's formulation of the
standard in Woodson).
241 Compare, e.g., Nelson by Carson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984) (in which defendant manufacturer knew that
products it sold to an import buyer would be resold to a retail chain operating nation-
wide) with Bean Dredging, 744 F.2d 1081 (in which manufacturer of castings sold its
products to distributors without any knowledge of the final products for which they
were intended or their destination but in which manufacturer was generally aware that
its component products could end up anywhere in the United States) and Violet, 613 F
Supp. 1563 (in which defendants were wholly unaware of where disposal companies
might dispose of their wastes but knew that those companies operated in more than one
state).
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The answer is not immediately apparent. At one level, con-
trol is clearly lacking in both situations since the location of the
product is dictated by the independent decisions of others. On
the other hand, it could be argued that control is plainly appar-
ent in both situations since the manufacturer could limit the
distribution of its products by a particular distributor or simply
refuse to sell to a distributor known to market in a particular
forum, and (in the second situation) a retailer could refuse to
sell the product to a purchaser the retailer knows will take the
product outside the forum.244
A conclusion that the manufacturer in the first scenario has
control over the location of its products and that, in the second
situation, the retailer or manufacturer does not, makes sense on
both intuitive and practical levels. Manufacturers in this first
scenario typically have the power to limit the distribution of
their products by contract. Moreover, the manufacturer clearly
derives at least indirect benefit from its distributor's activities in
the forum, despite the inder~endent nature of the distributor's
marketing decisions. In the second scenario, the retailer and
manufacturer typically exercise no control over the destination
of the product after its purchase. 245 Of course, the retailer could
inquire as to the purchaser's intent with respect to the product's
location and base its decision to sell the product on the infor-
mation obtained. However, that process is likely to operate
2" The manufacturer in this second situation, unlike the retailer, generally has no
opportunity to refuse to sell the product since the manufacturer usually does not deal
directly with the purchaser.
24, See Violet, 613 F Supp. at 1571-72 (recognizing distinction on this basis); see
also Seidelson, A Supreme Court Conclusion and Two Rationales that Defy Compre-
hension: Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 53 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 563, 576-78 (1987) (distinguising the two situations on the basis of manufac-
turer's ability to negotiate limitations on movement of its products or rights of indem-
nification); Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A
Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58
N.C.L. REv 407, 426 (1980) (To defendant, movement of product after retail sale is
"adventitious, uncontrollable and not beneficial"). But see Woodson, 444 U.S. at 307
n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The manufacturer in Gray had no more control over
which States its goods would reach than did [the regional distributor and retailer] in this
case."); Jay, supra note 118, at 444 (questioning the ability of the manufacturer to
influence the distribution process, especially when the product it sells is a small part of
a more complex device).
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imperfectly 46 and would impose a substantial burden and con-
sequent costs on the retailer's operation of its business. Moreo-
ver, the retailer, or manufacturer, derives little or no benefit
from the purchaser's act of removing the product to the forum
that might justify the retailer's adopting such a process to avoid
amenability to jurisdiction there.247
More importantly, however, these distinctions with respect
to control are consistent with Professor Brilmayer's cost allo-
cation explanation. The manufacturer that intentionally markets
its products in the forum offers the perfect illustration of the
control theory This manufacturer has maximum control over
the location of the products and thus the greatest ability to
assess the costs of its operations in relation to the benefits
derived from the forum. 248 If the costs exceed the benefits the
manufacturer can readily withdraw from the forum.
A manufacturer that does not intend to exploit the forum
market but merely knows or is generally aware of the markets
of the distributors to which it sells plainly has less control with
regard to the location of its products. Its distance from the
immediate decisionmaking authority (which lies with the distrib-
utor or a final product manufacturer) results not only in a
diminished ability to assess the costs and benefits of forum
distribution, but also in a decreased ability to effect a withdrawal
from the forum. As a result, the effectiveness of withdrawal as
a check on the forum's improper assertion of jurisdiction is
similarly diminished. At the same time, however, that effective-
ness is not eliminated. The manufacturer, after all, retains some
-1 For example, the purchaser might honestly believe at the time of purchase that
he would use the product in the place of purchase but later decide to take it elsewhere,
where it causes injury, or the purchaser, knowing that the defendant will refuse to sell
the product to him if he intends to take it out of state, could simply lie about its
intended destination.
14' See Sousa v. Ocean Sunflower Shipping Co., 608 F Supp. 1309, 1314 (N.D.
Cal. 1984); Dayton, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce, 7 Ray Lrri-
GATION 239, 270 (1988). But see Jay, supra note 118, at 446 ("It makes little difference
to the [manufacturer] that the consumer is the one carrying the goods to other places;
if anything, the company gains from wider exposure of its product.").
m See, e.g., Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distribs. Pty.
Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 206 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (indicating precise number of products
sold through distribution system and percentage sold in forum, as well as gross revenues
derived from forum sales).
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ability to structure distribution of its products, albeit with less
precision, through contractual arrangements with the distribu-
tor.2 9
The third situation, in which the product's presence in the
forum is directly attributable to the purchaser rather than to any
member of the distribution chain, clearly suggests the absence
of control. Unlike the manufacturer in the second scenario, the
retailer or manufacturer has no realistic method of structuring
its conduct to avoid jurisdiction in the forum. The nature of the
retailer-consumer relationship is typically episodic, and the re-
tailer has no right to restrict the purchaser's use of the products
after purchase. As a consequence of the retailer's (or manufac-
turer's) effective inability to withdraw from the forum, the state
is insufficiently restrained from asserting jurisdiction at the ex-
pense of nonresidents and in violation of the boundaries of its
sovereign power.
2 0
Finally, this control theory clarifies the role of foreseeability
in jurisdiction analysis. Under this approach, foreseeability is
49 In Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. 1985), for
example, defendant sold its products to independent trading companies that subsequently
sold those products in Texas. Although defendant had not retained the contractual power
to dictate the destination of its products, defendant denved substantial benefits from
the forum (between 40 and 48 million dollars worth of its steel reached the forum) and
defendant was well aware of the distribution area since it routinely confirmed the content
and destination of each order placed with the trading companies. This knowledge would
allow defendant to make a cost-benefit assessment with respect to the forum and, thus,
to make an informed decision with respect to whether its activities there were sufficiently
profitable to warrant remaining in the forum. But see Jay, supra note 118, at 444
(noting that while there are times when a manufacturer in a Gray situation can exercise
control over its products, the more usual situation is one in wlch defendants are
"neither certain of the volume of their products m the forum, nor able to influence the
distribution process." (footnote omitted)).
20 The theoretical right to refuse to sell compels no different conclusion. To the
extent manufacturers in the second situation may be required to employ more drastic
steps to avoid jurisdiction, i.e., by contracting to restrict the scope of distribution, it is
arguably justifiable because that restriction is, at some level, commercially practicable
and because those manufacturers enjoy the benefits of the distributor's activities. Re-
tailers or manufacturers in the Woodson scenario, however, not only derive little or no
benefit from the movement of the product from the place of purchase to the forum but
to the extent there are some indirect or "collateral" benefits arising in that context, they
are more difficult to assess. Moreover, the costs and manageability problems inherent
in requiring a retailer to employ such a procedure to escape jurisdiction could substan-
tially undermine the viability of the retailer's operations and interfere with the flow of
interstate commerce.
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only relevant to the extent it indicates defendant's ability to
control the location of its productsY 1 Other commentators ac-
knowledging sovereignty limitations have challenged this conclu-
sion (and the limitations imposed by Woodson) as unduly
restrictive of the state's authority to exercise jurisdiction. They
do not argue that defendant's conduct-based expectations should
play no role in junsdiction analysis;.252 and indeed, they suggest
that jurisdiction is appropriate whenever the forum has a regu-
latory interest in the lawsuit and the forum activity or effect to
be regulated is "foreseeable" 3 or "reasonably foreseeable.' ' 4
Rather, these commentators reject the point at which the bound-
ary of the state's power vis-a-vis the defendant is drawn.
Yet, as Professor Brilmayer has shown, drawing this line at
the defendant's negligent conduct is not inconsistent with a
jurisdictional theory recogmzing sovereignty limitations. The de-
fendant's ability to control the location of its product and, thus,
to avoid amenability to jurisdiction, operates as an effective
check on a state's willingness to overreach the bounds of its
sovereign power In contrast, a foreseeability of effect test allows
the forum impermissibly to shift the costs of jurisdiction to
nonresident consumers.
Nor does this control theory ignore the state's regulatory
interests, for they are reflected m the nature of the contacts that
251 Brilmayer, supra note 118, at 112.
12 See Stebbins, supra note 185, at 129-31; Stein, supra note 186, at 749-50.
Professor Stebbins agrees that personal jurisdiction analysis should enable defendant to
predict, with some accuracy, when its actions will subject it to junsdiction in the forum,
although she argues that a foreseeability of effects test, rejected by the Court in
Woodson, would serve that need. Under Professor Stein's theory, foreseeability is
relevant because if the forum event or occurrence is unforeseeable, the state's exercise
of jurisdiction will either fail to achieve the desired regulatory objective, since defendant
will not alter its conduct in response to the assertion of jurisdiction, or the state will
achieve its objective but at the expense of other states' sovereignty rights, since defendant
will be required to alter its conduct generally to avoid further state regulation. But see
Weisburd, supra note 200, at 405-07 (arguing that jurisdiction may be exercised over
persons causing unintended and even unforeseen effects as long as the state could regulate
that forum effect).
15 See Stein, supra note 186, at 749-50.
11 See Stebbins, supra note 185, at 126-33. Professor Stebbins would apply a two-
part standard to determine a forum's authority to assert jurisdiction: "1) was it [rea-
sonably] foreseeable that defendant's conduct, even if untainted by negligence would
lead to the alleged effects?; 2) if not, was it [reasonably] foreseeable that negligence or
other defendant misfeasance would produce the alleged effects?" Id. at 130 (brackets m
original).
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are counted for purposes of assessing junsdiction. 25s When a
state asserts a regulatory justification for its assertion of juris-
diction, its nght to exercise jurisdiction is based on the existence
of defendant's related contacts with tle forum. If, as is typically
the case, "relatedness" is defined in terms of substantive rele-
vance, "forum contacts that are related to the dispute are exactly
those already defined as a proper subject for regulation under
the applicable substantive law ",256 Thus, although the state's
regulatory interest does not directly measure its authority to
assert jurisdiction, that interest does influence the jurisdiction
analysis because it indicates which facts are related.
257
Finally, a jurisdiction standard incorporating a control re-
quirement offers a clearer guide to potential defendants who
wish to determine, and to act upon, their potential amenability
to jurisdiction. Under this standard, defendants may predict
jurisdictional consequences from their own actions, with fewer
opportunities for surprise arising from after-the-fact judgments
as to what they should have foreseen. Consequently, due process
interests of notice and predictability are better served.
3. Sovereignty Limitations and a Proposed Restructuring of
the Stream of Commerce Theory
The courts' application of the stream of commerce theory
has been characterized by interrelated themes of fairness and
25 Brilmayer, supra note 118, at 105-07. In a discussion of interest analysis as an
alternate method of analyzing personal junsdiction, Professor Brilmayer notes the prob-
lem of defimng a "legitimate" state interest and suggests that to the extent that interest
includes a state's special interest in regulating particular substantive conduct, that interest
is protected by the "related contacts" concept.
Id. at 86.
"I Id. at 106-07 Unlike some who accept sovereignty limits but criticize the pur-
poseful availment standard, I am not yet persuaded that a state should have the authority
to assert jurisdiction whenever its regulatory interest would warrant the application of
forum law. While there is a substantial overlap between the choice of law and personal
jurisdiction inquines, and the interests they protect, choice of law analysis directly
addresses the state's right to promote its legitimate regulatory ends. Consequently,
although the boundary of state power drawn by the control theory limits (in some
degree) the state's authority to use jurisdiction as a means of achieving these ends, the
theory offers a better accommodation of the relevant interests. Not only does a control
criterion afford a check on state overreaching and provide greater certainty in the
jurisdiction analysis, but the state's core regulatory authority is (or should be) adequately
protected in the constitutional choice of law analysis.
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convenience. A defendant that places its product into the stream
of commerce may be subjected to jurisdiction in the forum both
because the multistate actor, the defendant, is better able than
the localized plaintiff to bear the costs of distant litigation, and
because the forum is typically the location of the injury and,
thus, convenient from a litigational standpoint.2 18 Similarly, it is
"fair" to require the defendant rather than the plaintiff to bear
the burden of litigation because the defendant "chooses" to
operate on a multistate level and derives benefits from those
multistate operations .259
As established in Part III.B.I., however, the stream of com-
merce theory cannot be justified by convenience considerations
alone, since a convenience analysis does not adequately reflect
the limitations on the state's sovereign authority Nor can a
rationale based on some balancing of the equities itself sustain
the theory Rather, a stream of commerce theory provides an
appropriate basis for jurisdiction only if it recognizes the defen-
dant's right to be free from assertions of jurisdiction by an
21 See Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 765-67; Metal-Matic Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
415 P.2d 617, 619 (Nev. 1966); see also International Harvester Co. v. Hendrickson
Mfg. Co., 459 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Ark. 1970) ("the standard of 'fair play and substantial
justice' is not to be utilized solely for the benefit of non-resident defendants, but rather
it is an equal guarantee to consumer-plaintiffs of a just, convement and reasonable
forum in which to try their suit."); Pennsalt Chemical Corp. v. Crown Cork & Seal
Co., 426 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Ark. 1968) ("much consideration must be given to the forum
which is more convement and to the facilities of modern transportation and commum-
cation.").
25 See, e.g., Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 766; Svendsen v. Questor Corp., 304 N.W.2d
428, 431 (Iowa 1981); Andersen v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 135 N.W.2d 639, 643
(Iowa 1965); see also DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3d
Cir. 1981) (noting that jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory is premised on
legal and economic benefits manufacturer enjoys from extended, though indirect, forum
sales and belief that fairness does not require insulation of the manufacturer from the
forum's long-arm reach merely because the products entered the forum through an
intermediary), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981); Currie, supra note 64, at 555 (balance
of equities favors suit by plaintiff in his state where plaintiff is stay-at-home injured by
goods shipped by defendant into the forum); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HAiv. L. Rav. 1121, 1167-69 (1966) (urging that
traditional preference accorded defendants in jurisdictional analysis be reversed when,
as in a typical stream of commerce situation, defendant engages in multistate conduct,
while plaintiff's conduct is essentially local); Case Comment, supra note 4, at 208 ("[Ilt
is more equitable to require a distant defendant to litigate in the forum where the
allegedly tortious consequences of its activities occurred than to require an injured
plaintiff to file suit in a distant state far from the locus of the injury.").
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unrelated sovereign and the existence of sovereignty limitations
and, accordingly, requires that the defendant have some ability
to control the location of its product. As this section makes
clear, these requirements mandate a rejection of the two prin-
cipal stream of commerce models discussed in Asahi and a
restructuring of the theory in a manner that, in some degree,
reflects Justice Stevens' comments on the stream of commerce
concept.
The courts have traditionally approved jurisdiction under the
stream of commerce theory in each of the three scenarios out-
lined in Part III.B.2. In the first situation, where the defendant
manufacturer has deliberately attempted to exploit the forum
market, the Court's purposeful availment standard is easily sat-
isfied. The manufacturer in this context has intentionally sought
a connection with the forum, and its purposeful activities there
both benefit the defendant and put it on notice of the-possibility
of suit there arising from an injury caused by its products.
260
Moreover, jurisdiction is also plainly consistent with sovereignty
limitations. The defendant is clearly responsible for the presence
of its products in the forum, and if the benefits from its activities
there prove insufficient to justify the burden imposed by the
state's assertion of jurisdiction, the defendant may elect to dis-
continue marketing its products there.
In the second scenario, as in Asahi, the defendant's products
reach the forum as a result of the independent distribution
schemes of others. Although the defendant in these situations
has no intent to market its products in the forum, or immediate
control over their location there, it does have some knowledge
or awareness that the products will or may reach the forum. In
addition, the defendant receives substantial economic and legal
benefits from the distribution efforts of others in the forum.
This scenario is not as plainly consistent with the traditional
purposeful availment standard. The defendant's receipt of sub-
stantial, though indirect, benefits from the forum efforts of
others clearly satisfies the beneficial aspect of the standard. To
See Stabilisterungsfonds Fur Wein, 647 F.2d 200; Poyner v. Erma Werke GMBH,
618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Cunningham v. Subaru of
Am., Inc., 631 F Supp. 132 (D. Kan. 1986); Weight v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A.,
604 F Supp. 968 (E.D. Va. 1985).
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conclude that the purposeful element is also satisfied, however,
requires a more generous interpretation of the term "purpose-
ful." In these situations any truly purposeful contact with the
forum is the distributor's or retailer's-entities that in this con-
text do not act at the direction or desire of the manufacturer.
Despite the somewhat attenuated nature of the defendant's
"purposefulness," the courts have readily attributed these forum
contacts to the defendant-first, on the basis of a presumed
intent of manufacturers to market their products in as many
fora as possible261 and second, because the defendant is deemed
to have "permitted" its products to be distributed in the forum.
This latter conclusion is based on the belief that the defendant's
ability to foresee the product's presence in the forum allows it
to structure its conduct. A defendant desiring to avoid jurisdic-
tion m the forum may, despite its lack of immediate control
over the distribution of its product, restrict that distribution.
262
The conclusion that the distribution of the defendant's prod-
uct in the forum is a result of the defendant's "choice" is, of
course, somewhat misleading. As previously suggested, a man-
ufacturer in this situation not only has no control over the
independent marketing decisions of its purchasers or its pur-
chasers' purchasers, but as a practical matter may not have any
knowledge of those purchasers' markets. Indeed, the defendant's
knowledge or awareness and its ability to control its product's
destination vary widely within this scenario, not only because of
the differences with regard to a defendant's actual knowledge
of its product's location, but also because of the differences in
the defendant's position in the distribution chain. Thus, on one
hand, the defendant may be a final product manufacturer op-
211 See Nelson by Carson, 717 F.2d at 1125-26; Andersen, 125 N.W.2d at 643;
Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 124 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn.
1963); see also Comment, supra note 86, at 1031; Jay, supra note 118, at 445 n.99
(arguing that nature of the manufacturing enterprise requires wide distribution and
denying business interest in distribution controls).
262 See Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 198 (5th Cir. 1980); Plant Food Co-
op v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp., 633 F.2d 155, 159 (9th Cir. 1980); Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 543, 551, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385, 394 (1985), rev'd,
107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987); see also Myers v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 600 F Supp.
977, 986 (D. Nev. 1984) (foreign company aware of distribution system has ability to
control contacts with forum).
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erating in a short distribution chain with actual knowledge,
although no immediate control, over its product's location.
263
On the other hand, the defendant might be a component man-
ufacturer only vaguely aware or completely unaware of its prod-
uct's ultimate destination.264 Perhaps most likely, the defendant's
circumstances will place it somewhere between these extremes.
That is, the defendant's ability to withdraw from the forum will
be dimimshed by its distant position in the distribution chan
265
or because it has some knowledge of its distributors' markets,
but substantially less precise information with regard to the
product's eventual location.
2
6
Whatever the specific scenario, the manufacturer's choices
in this context are limited. The manufacturer may determine the
geographic scope of its purchasers' markets and avoid amena-
bility to jurisdiction in the forum by curtailing the distribution
of its products. Or it may insure against the risk of distant
litigation. That these defendants often have only limited knowl-
edge of their purchasers' distribution plans and enjoy a more
limited ability to avoid jurisdiction has not traditionally dis-
turbed the courts, apparently because of the substantial benefits
these manufacturers obtain from the multistate distribution of
their products.
Yet, as discussed in Part III.B.2., these limitations on defen-
dant's choices are not without consequences from a state sov-
ereignty perspective. As the defendant becomes further removed
from the decision to market its goods in the forum, it necessarily
loses some of its ability to control its amenability to jurisdiction,
and, thus, to check state overreaching.267 At the same time,
because the defendant can, at some broader level, use contractual
arrangements to avoid jurisdiction in the forum, it retains some
ability to withdraw This more limited ability affords some check,
albeit of diimnished effectiveness, on a state's willingness to
overstep the bounds of its legitimate sovereign power.
268
265 See Nelson by Carson, 713 F.2d 1120.
6 See Bean Dredging, 744 F.2d 1081; Violet, 613 F Supp. 1563.
265 See Asaht, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385; State ex rel. Hydraulic Servocon-
trols Corp. v. Dale, 657 P.2d 211 (Or. 1982).
26 See Haley v. Wright Mfg. Co., 651 F Supp. 116 (M.D. La. 1986).
267 See Bean Dredging, 744 F.2d 1081; Asahi, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385.
268 See, e.g., Nelson by Carson, 717 F.2d 1120.
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In the third scenario, the defendant is subject to jurisdiction
in the forum solely because use of its product by the ultimate
purchaser there was foreseeable. Although Woodson has sub-
stantially eliminated assertions of jurisdiction over the retailer in
these situations, courts have been considerably less reluctant to
assert that authority over manufacturers. The Ninth Circuit, for
example, sustained the jurisdiction of an Oregon district court
over a Japanese splice manufacturer that had sold a splice to
the owner of an oceangoing vessel.26 9 A longshoreman, injured
by the allegedly defective splice while the vessel was docked in
Oregon, brought suit there against the Japanese manufacturer.
Although the manufacturer's only contact with Oregon was its
product's presence there, jurisdiction was upheld because defen-
dant knew that the vessel would travel to the western Umted
States and, thus, could foresee that its product would be "used"
in Oregon. 270
An assertion of jurisdiction in this situation is inconsistent
with the Court's purposeful availment standard. Again, the de-
fendant has not attempted to market its products in the forum
or, indeed, anywhere outside its place of manufacture. At most,
one could argue that because the defendant knew that its product
would be used outside Japan, the defendant's sale to the ship
owner constituted a voluntary affiliation with international com-
merce rather than with the forum. Nor, unlike the second sce-
nario, did the defendant derive economic benefit from Oregon.
The defendant sold its product to an ultimate purchaser in
Japan; there was no subsequent resale in a region from which
20 Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983).
270 Id. at 1358-59; see also Giotis, 800 F.2d at 667-68 (manufacturer and distributor
subject to junisdiction in the forum although, apparently, their products were not
distributed there and the injury-causing product reached forum through act of purchaser;
court concluded that distributor advertised nationally and, thus, forum was within the
scope of its marketing efforts, there was no evidence that defendants were unaware of
the scope of those efforts and defendants, as "upstream" actors in the distribution
chain, benefited from those efforts); cf. Sousa, 608 F Supp. at 1314 (concluding that
jurisdiction over Japanese shipbuilder in circumstances similar to Hedrick could not be
justified under stream of commerce theory; shipbuilder had not sought to market its
product in forum and shipowner to whom defendant sold the ship in Japan was not
"distributor" for the purpose of delivenng defendant's product into the forum).
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defendant could be said to have obtained even indirect benefit.27'
In short, the apparent basis for Oregon's assertion of jurisdiction
was simply the foreseeability of injury there or the defendant's
status as a manufacturer. In the latter instance, the implicit
assumption is that the manufacturer is better able and more
properly subject to the burdens of distant litigation than the
individual plaintiff-an assumption remscent of convenience
considerations rather than sovereignty limitations.
That the forum's exercise of jurisdiction in this situation is
inconsistent with sovereignty limitations is clear. The defendant
lacks any ability to control the post-purchase location of its
product and, thus, any ability to withdraw from the forum in
the event forum costs outweigh whatever benefits the defendant
derives from its products' presence there. As a result, there exists
no effective restraint on the forum's illegitimate exercise of
jurisdiction.272
It is apparent from the above discussion that neither the
stream of commerce theory advocated by Justice Brennan nor
that asserted by Justice O'Connor properly reflects the sover-
eignty limitations on a state's authority to assert jurisdiction.
Justice Brennan's theory is troubling for two reasons. First, it
would permit a forum's assertion of jurisdiction in the third
scenario, an assertion generally inconsistent with sovereignty
limits on the states' jurisdictional power Second, by endorsing
the stream of commerce theory as traditionally formulated, with-
271 See Sousa, 608 F Supp. at 1314 (in which the court concluded that defendant
did not derive any economic benefit in California from sale of ship to ultimate purchaser
in Japan; although it might "indirectly benefit from the international market for Japa-
nese steel and United States lumber because this trade increases the demand for vessels
capable of transporting these products [,] [s]uch derivative econonuc benefits [would]
not support jurisdiction."). But see Jay, supra note 118, at 446 (arguing that
defendant in these circumstances benefits from the exposure of its products in the
forum).
22 One possible exception to this conclusion is the situation presented in Hall, 669
F Supp. 753 (see supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text), in which there is a direct
relationship between the manufacturer and the purchaser, the ultimate purchaser is a
commercial actor rather than a typical consumer, and the nature of the business is such
that the ultimate purchaser does not consume but in effect "distributes" the product
for "consumption" by others. These factors suggest not only a direct (rather than
collateral) beneficial relationship, but also a relationship in wich the manufacturer
could seek to limit its amenability to jurisdiction by contractual arrangements.
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out further guidance, Justice Brennan merely perpetuates the
confusion that has characterized the theory's application.
Justice O'Connor's theory, on the other hand, offers several
attractions. In the first instance, a standard that requires the
manufacturer's intent to market in the forum is easier to apply
It plainly reflects the type of purposeful, beneficial relationship
between the forum and the defendant that the Court has tradi-
tionally required. Furthermore, it focuses on the defendant's
specific intent to serve the forum market, rather than on "fo-
reseeability," a term that has greatly contributed to the confu-
sion apparent in stream of commerce cases. 211 Second, and
significantly, the standard is consistent with due process limita-
tions on state sovereignty The defendant's amenability to juris-
diction would no longer be subject to the independent marketing
decisions of unrelated purchasers and distributors but would be,
instead, a matter completely within the defendant's control. The
defendant could structure its conduct with substantial assurance
as to where that conduct would subject it to jurisdiction, and
its ability to withdraw from the forum would provide an effective
restraint on that state's overreaching of its legitimate power.
Moreover, the standard would plainly preclude the forum's as-
sertion of jurisdiction in the third scenario.
Yet, adopting the O'Connor standard is also problematic. If
the state's authority to assert jurisdiction depends on the defen-
dant's intent to exploit the forum market, as the O'Connor
standard requires, the forum may not exercise jurisdiction in the
second scenario. Of course, drawing the sovereignty boundary
at this point would ensure the defendant the greatest control
over its amenability and provide the most effective check on the
state's incentive to exceed its sovereign authority However, this
intent requirement would also prevent the states' exercise of
jurisdiction in circumstances similar to Gray-circumstances in
which jurisdiction has traditionally been held to be "fair" and
271 But see Dessem, supra note 8, at 68-69 (asserting that intent requirement would
"further complicate an already complex determination"). Cf. Seidelson, supra note 245,
at 572-78 (arguing that function of due process m jurisdictional context appears to be
prevention of surprise to defendant and that "additional conduct" requirement does not
serve that function).
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"reasonable." 2 74 Moreover, adoption of such a requirement would
suggest that sovereignty restrictions demand the most effective
check on state overreaching and would ignore the sigmficant, if
more limited, effectiveness of the check constituted by the ability
of many defendants in these situations to withdraw from the
forum. In sum, a complete prohibition on the forum's exercise
of jurisdiction in the situations within this second category un-
duly restricts the scope of the state's sovereign power
A conclusion that the O'Connor standard is too restrictive
and the Brennan standard impermissibly broad, however, only
partially defines the scope of an appropriate stream of commerce
theory A theory that properly reflects the control requirement
must clearly permit the forum to assert jurisdiction over a de-
fendant that intentionally markets its products in the forum and,
just as clearly, prohibit most assertions of jurisdiction over a
defendant whose product reaches the forum only because the
purchaser takes it there. In addition, that theory must allow
assertions of jurisdiction when, although the defendant has not
deliberately sought a forum market, the product has reached the
forum in the regular course of distribution.
Two standards potentially satisfy these criteria. The first
would permit the forum to exercise jurisdiction over the defen-
dant whenever it knows or can foresee that its product will reach
the forum through the operation of the distribution system; that
is, the product's presence there is not solely attributable to the
act of the purchaser or one outside the distribution chain. This
standard would preclude jurisdiction in the third scenario while
sustainmng all assertions of jurisdiction in the first and second
scenanos. Permitting the forum to assert jurisdiction in all si-
tuations encompassed within the second scenario not only avoids
the problem of distinguishing among the degrees of the defen-
dant's knowledge or awareness with respect to the marketing of
its product, thereby offering some "bright-line" guidance to the
274 Indeed, the O'Connor standard would apparently prevent a forum's exercise of
jurisdiction over any component manufacturer since those manufacturers typically do
not intend to market their products outside the place of purchase. See also Weintraub,
Asahl Sends Personal Jurisdiction Down the Tubes, 23 TEx. INT'L L.J. 55, 66-67 (1988)
(suggesting that O'Connor opimon indicates intent to exempt component manufacturers
from jurisdiction).
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courts, but is also consistent with the courts' traditional rulings
in these circumstances.275 Moreover, this position is arguably
consistent with the control rationale since, despite the variations
with regard to the defendant's knowledge or distance from the
marketing decision, the defendant ultimately has some recourse
to contractual arrangements by which it may limit its amenability
to jurisdiction in the forum.
A second standard would employ a sliding scale approach to
determine the forum's authority to assert jurisdiction in the
stream of commerce context. Thus, where the defendant has
complete control over its product's location in the forum, the
defendant would be properly subject to jurisdiction there for
litigation arising out of that contact. As the defendant's ability
to control the location of its products becomes more limited,
however, due to the defendant's distance from the marketing
decision, a state's right to assert jurisdiction would depend on
other indicia of the defendant's notice of amenability to suit and
its ability to withdraw from the forum. This assessment need
not require abstract distinctions. Instead, evidence of an ongoing
relationship between the defendant and the distribution system
through which products reach the forum, and defendant's receipt
of substantial economic benefits from the products' presence in
the forum could provide objective support for a conclusion that
the defendant was sufficiently able to withdraw from the fo-
rum.276 Finally, where the product's presence in the forum is
25 As suggested in Part II (and earlier in this section), the courts typically have
sustained the forum's exercise of jurisdiction as long as it was "foreseeable" that the
manufacturer's products would or could reach the forum. They have made no distinctions
based on the defendant's actual knowledge or ability to control the distribution of their
products. See supra notes 77-79, 120-22, 261-66 and accompanying text.
26 Other commentators, in somewhat different contexts, have also suggested the
relevance of these factors in a stream of commerce analysis. See Dessem, supra note 8,
at 75-77 (arguing that due process is satisfied whenever defendant is aware that its
products have entered the forum and Justice Stevens' factors of "volume" and "value"
indicate that defendant is serving the forum market); Case Comment, supra note 4, at
224-26 (proposing a two-step analysis that would permit jurisdiction if defendant has
actual or constructive knowledge of forum sales. In determining whether knowledge
should be imputed to the defendant, courts should look to such factors as the quantity
and continuity of forum sales, forum revenue and market share and, with respect to
component manufacturers, the course of dealing and length of relationship with the
final product manufacturer).
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outside the defendant's control, jurisdiction would be inappro-
priate.
Under this approach, a defendant that intentionally markets
its goods in the forum would be subject to jurisdiction there for
injuries caused in the forum by its products. Conversely, a
defendant whose product entered the forum only because the
purchaser or one outside the distribution chain took it there,
would normally be beyond the forum's legitimate jurisdictional
reach. Finally, the state's right to exercise junsdiction over those
whose products reach the forum through regular distribution
channels would depend on the defendant's ability to control that
result. The defendant could not claim immunity from jurisdic-
tion solely on the basis of an absence of a specific intent to
market its goods in the forum. But where that defendant's lack
of knowledge regarding its product's destination or distance
from the actual decision to market that product in the forum
suggests the defendant's inability to control its product's loca-
tion, jurisdiction will be appropriate only if other factors suggest
notice and ability to withdraw from the forum.
Unlike the first standard, this approach is potentially more
difficult to apply because it attempts to recognize the variations
among the situations within.the second scenario that influence
the effectiveness of a restraint on state overreaching. However,
that recognition can be achieved, albeit imperfectly, by looking
to objective criteria already familiar to the courts. Moreover,
this standard more clearly reflects the rationale underlying the
control requirement.
While not eliminating all uncertainty from the application of
a stream of commerce analysis, a sliding scale approach does
offer a number of advantages over either the approach espoused
by Justice Brennan or that proposed by Justice O'Connor First,
the approach is designed to implement the constitutional values
relevant to personal jurisdiction analysis. By requiring that the
defendant have some ability to control its product's presence in
the forum, this standard recognizes, and assures respect for,
sovereignty limitations on the authority of a state to assert
jurisdiction.
In addition, the approach provides a more workable stan-
dard. In determining the defendant's amenability to jurisdiction,
the courts will be asked to make judgments similar to those they
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have made for some time-that is, the extent to which the
defendant is responsible for its product's presence in the forum
and, m some cases, the benefits that the defendant has derived
from that forum presence. Yet, the problems that the courts
have encountered m applying that standard should be nmmized
because that determination will be made within a proper theo-
retical framework. More specifically, by using this framework,
the courts could avoid the confusion engendered by unguided
reliance on the term "foreseeability " Foreseeability in this con-
text is relevant only to the extent it indicates the defendant's
control over the location of its product. 2 7 In those situations in
which the product's presence is merely foreseeable and the de-
fendant has, in fact, no control over that result, the forum's
assertion of jurisdiction will be inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
The courts' historic acceptance of a stream of commerce
concept and their invocation of a common formula have, for
too long, hidden the confusion and division characterizing ap-
plications of the stream of commerce theory The courts' con-
fusion is attributable, in part, to the ambiguities in Gray itself
but also, and more significantly, to the courts' uncertainty re-
garding the constitutional values that underlie the theory
While Asahi failed to resolve the courts' uncertainty, it per-
formed a useful service by making clear the existence of sharply
divergent views. This division among the justices, in turn, should
prompt a re-examination of the stream of commerce analysis
and an identification and clarification of the constitutional val-
ues that analysis purports to serve.
This Article argues that the Court should reaffirm the exis-
tence of sovereignty limitations on the states' authority to assert
jurisdiction and clarify the implications of those limits for per-
sonal jurisdiction analysis. This Article concludes that recogniz-
ing these limits requires a restructuring of the stream of commerce
theory and suggests a revised approach that not only reflects the
2" See Brilmayer, supra note 118, at 112.
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relevant constitutional values but also affords a more workable
standard than that currently applied by the courts.

